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Abstract
This paper develops a general framework for models, static or dynamic, in which agents
simultaneously make both discrete and continuous choices. I show that such models are non-
parametrically identified. Based on the constructive identification arguments, I build a novel
two-step estimation method in the lineage of Hotz and Miller (1993) but extended to discrete
and continuous choice models. The method is especially attractive for complex dynamic models
because it significantly reduces the computational burden associated with their estimation. To
illustrate my new method, I estimate a dynamic model of female labor supply and consumption.
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Many economic problems involve joint discrete and continuous choices. For example, a firm can
decide on a pricing scheme (per unit, flat rate) and the corresponding price level (Timmins, 2002).
It can decide what to produce and the corresponding sales price (Crawford et al., 2019). Firms also
decide whether to register their business and how many workers to hire (Ulyssea, 2018). Students
select their majors and decide how much effort to exert into their study (Ahn et al., 2019). Con-
sumers can decide what to buy and how much of it to consume (e.g. appliance choice and demand
for energy, Dubin and McFadden, 1984). In housing, buyers decide their house size and housing
tenure (Hanemann, 1984; Bajari et al., 2013). The buyer of a car selects a model and the mileage of
the car (Bento et al., 2009). Individuals decide whether to retire or not and how much they plan to
consume accordingly (Iskhakov et al., 2017). Similarly, labor force participation and consumption
are joint choices for potential workers (Altuǧ and Miller, 1998; Blundell et al., 2016).
In these cases, a rational agent makes both decisions simultaneously. Here ‘simultaneous’ means
that given the information she has, the agent jointly make both choices. As a result, the discrete
choice is endogenous with respect to the continuous choice and vice versa. To take a labor market
example, if she works, a woman consumes differently than if she does not work: she has two different
conditional consumption choices. And at the same time, her decision of whether to work or not is
dependent on these two conditional continuous choices. Unfortunately, the identification of models
with simultaneous choices is difficult (Matzkin, 2007). Indeed, there is a core observability problem
because we only observe the continuous choice made in the selected discrete alternative, and we
do not know the counterfactual choices the individual would have made in the other alternatives.
Ideally, we would like to recover counterfactual continuous choices using the choices of individuals
with similar characteristics but who chose another alternative. However, doing so is not possible
if individuals also differ on factors which are unobserved by the econometrician and affect both
continuous and the discrete choices. In this case, two identical individuals as measured by their
observed covariates might still differ on the unobserved dimension. There is a problem of selec-
tion on unobservables, which prevents the identification of counterfactual continuous choices. To
further pursue the example, if an econometrician observes that working individuals consume more
than unemployed individuals, she cannot identify whether this is because the consumption choice
conditional on working is truly higher or because individuals with an unobserved higher taste for
consumption select themselves more into working.
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This paper develops a general framework of simultaneous discrete-continuous choice models
suited for static or dynamic problems. I provide minimal necessary conditions under which non-
parametric identification of the model can be obtained, using an instrument for the unobserved
selection. Then, building upon the identification, I provide an estimation method for these models.
The method is attractive because it yields significant computational gains over the estimation of
dynamic models, in the lineage of Hotz and Miller (1993). I also show how to apply this method to
a dynamic discrete-continuous choice model of female labor force participation and consumption.
The first contribution of this paper is that I provide a constructive proof for the non-parametric
identification of a general class of structural models in which agents simultaneously make a discrete
and a continuous choices. To do so, I require an instrument that must be relevant for the selection
into the discrete choice and excluded from the conditional continuous choices. For example, the
previous discrete choice can be a good instrument in the presence of switching costs. Indeed, it im-
pacts the current discrete decision through the switching cost. Conditional on the current discrete
decision, it is excluded from the current continuous choice. In this way, observable differences in the
distribution of the choices with respect to the instrument can be attributed to unobserved differ-
ences in selection and not differences in continuous choices. I show that, paired with restrictions on
the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on the continuous choice (monotonicity, rank invariance), the
instrument allows us to achieve non-parametric identification of the optimal discrete and continuous
choices. Once the optimal choices are identified, it can be further shown that the rest of the model
is identified, for example, by exploiting first-order conditions (in the spirit of Blundell et al., 1997).
The second contribution of the paper is in terms of estimation. I build a two-step estimation
method, similar to Hotz and Miller (1993) but for discrete and continuous choices. In the first
step, one estimates the policies, which I name after Hotz-Miller’s CCPs: Conditional Continuous
Choices (CCCs), and Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs). This step is built on the identifi-
cation arguments. The policies are estimated directly from the data without solving the structural
model. To this end, I propose a novel method that estimates the entire monotone continuous choice
functions directly instead of proceeding pointwise. In the second step, one uses the estimated CCCs
and CCPs to estimate the structure of the model. For example, I exploit the fact that within my
general framework, the payoffs are related to optimal choices through the first-order conditions. My
estimation method is attractive because it yields sizeable computational gains. Typical dynamic
discrete or continuous choice models are difficult to estimate because they involve solving the theo-
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retical model (either by backward recursion or fixed point algorithms). Dynamic discrete-continuous
choices model are even more difficult to estimate because the mixed choices can introduce kinks and
non-concavities in the value function (Iskhakov et al., 2017). Given that I can recover the CCCs
and CCPs in the first stage, I can exploit them to estimate the rest of the model without having
to compute the value function or solve the model. It yields computational gains comparable to the
computational gains generated by Hotz and Miller (1993) in the dynamic discrete choice literature.
The gains are so important that they not only reduce the time required to estimate the models,
but also make it possible to estimate models that have thus far been deemed computationally in-
tractable. In this respect, my method may facilitate the use of simultaneous discrete-continuous
choice models.
Finally, I illustrate my method by building and estimating a dynamic life-cycle model of women’s
consumption and labor force participation, in the spirit of Blundell et al. (1997, 2016). This ap-
plication has been implemented under a parametric framework for practical reasons. First, doing
so avoids ‘curse of dimensionality’ concerns, and second, it makes my empirical findings compara-
ble to the existing literature. I add to existing models a more flexible distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity. Thanks to my method, I flexibly estimate the complete distribution of consumption
choices and working probabilities at any given set of observed covariates (assets, earnings, family
status, education, etc.). Hence, I can recover distributions such as that of the marginal propensity
to consume when earnings or benefits increase for any individual. I use these estimated policies
to estimate the parameters of the structural model. For example, I find a constant relative risk
aversion of 1.63, close to the value of 1.56 in Blundell et al. (1994) and the value of 1.53 in Alan et al.
(2009). All things considered, the method developed in this paper allows for more complete models
in terms of unobserved heterogeneity, with a faster estimation and I still find estimates consistent
with the existing literature. Therefore the method is very attractive in practice.
Related Literature:
There is a vast empirical literature that uses dynamic discrete choice models. For example, such
works study labor market transition and career choice (Keane and Wolpin, 1997), fertility choice
(Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989) and education choice (Arcidiacono, 2004). Starting from the bus
replacement problem of Rust (1987), developments have been made in the estimation and iden-
tification of these models. They include non-exhaustively: Hotz and Miller (1993); Hotz et al.
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(1994); Rust (1994); Magnac and Thesmar (2002); Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007); Kasahara
and Shimotsu (2009); Arcidiacono and Miller (2011); Hu and Shum (2012); Arcidiacono and Miller
(2019, 2020); Abbring and Daljord (2020). For a survey, see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) or
Arcidiacono and Ellickson (2011).
Similarly, the literature on dynamic continuous choice models is also voluminous, especially con-
cerning consumption/saving choices (Carroll, 2006) or investment choices (Hong and Shum, 2010).
There are also methods such as Bajari et al. (2007) that can be applied to either dynamic discrete
choice models or dynamic continuous choice models (but not both).
However, in many cases, economic problems involve several joint decisions, not only one discrete
choice or only one continuous choice. For example, labor force participation is very much related
to saving decisions. By focusing only on one of these two dimensions and ignoring the other en-
dogenous choice, one might be missing something important. Unfortunately, empirical applications
of the dynamic discrete-continuous choice framework are less popular, as there was no generally
identified setup prior to this work. For example, Blundell et al. (1997) provide identification of
such models once the optimal choices are identified but do not directly address the identification
of the choices. The existing literature employs several tricks to overcome the unobserved selec-
tion problem. The most common is to have implicit or explicit assumptions about the unobserved
selection process. For example, Dubin and McFadden (1984), Hanemann (1984) or Bento et al.
(2009) have specific assumptions about their error disturbances (independence, measurement er-
rors, known joint distribution), which generate a specific selection process. Blevins (2014) studies
the non-parametric identification of dynamic discrete-continuous choice models but assumes a very
specific timing in which the discrete choice takes place before the realization of the nonsepara-
ble shock and the continuous decision. Hence, unobserved selection is not allowed to depend on
nonseparable shock realization. Similarly, Iskhakov et al. (2017) break the simultaneity issue by
assuming that the discrete retirement choice is taken before and based on the expectations about
the continuous consumption choice. Murphy (2018) also imposes that the two choices are taken
sequentially. In his paper, parcel owners first decide whether to build or not, and only afterwards,
a nonseparable price shock is realized and they decide on their house size accordingly if they chose
to build in the first stage. The problem is that the sequentiality of the choices is a strong assump-
tion, and it might lead to biased results if the true decision process is in fact simultaneous. For
example, in Murphy (2018), it is likely that small price realization will increase both the house size
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and the probability of building a house. The imposed timing ignores this, as the discrete building
choice is only based on expectations about the price shock and corresponding house size choice.
Thus it might miss part of what is truly happening in the data. My general simultaneous choice
framework nests these different timing assumptions, which have testable implications within the
framework. Thus I can verify when the sequentiality assumption is reasonable. Another technique
is to discretize the continuous choice such that the model becomes a dynamic discrete choice model.
For example, De Groote and Verboven (2019) study the adoption of solar photovoltaic systems and
discretize the continuous level of adopted capacities. This is appealing, as it allows the application
of known techniques in the dynamic discrete choice literature. However, discretizing the continuous
choice is implicitly equivalent to making an assumption about the unobserved selection process via
the assumption on the distribution of the additive discrete error terms. I show in this paper that
by exploiting the continuous nature of the choice, the unobserved selection process can be identified
instead of being assumed. Therefore, one can focus on the true discrete-continuous choice problem
without discretizing the continuous choice. Another solution is to completely abstract from the
nonseparable shock, i.e., to assume that individuals with the same observed covariates will make
the same continuous choice. A more convincing alternative is to reduce the level of unobserved
heterogeneity, for example, by including only a finite number of unobserved types (Blundell et al.,
2016). My approach is more general, as I allow for a more flexible distribution of unobserved het-
erogeneity.
The closest literature for the identification of simultaneous discrete-continuous choice can be
found in static reduced-form identification analysis of non-parametric simultaneous equations (Matzkin,
2007, 2008; Imbens and Newey, 2009), nonseparable models (Chesher, 2003; Chernozhukov et al.,
2020), the discrete-continuous Roy model (Newey, 2007), treatment effects with endogenous selec-
tion into treatment (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005, 2006, 2008),
or in reduced-form identification analysis of dynamic treatment effects (Heckman and Navarro,
2007; Heckman et al., 2016). In this literature, the idea of using an instrument for non-parametric
identification of simultaneous equations is frequent (Newey and Powell, 2003). However, my main
contribution here is that I obtain identification under very weak and testable assumptions on the
instrument. I only need a condition that the instrument is relevant, except at most at a finite set of
points. This relevance yields a non-overlapping condition, similar to what Torgovitsky (2015) and
D’Haultfœuille and Février (2015) employ in a different context with continuous treatment. Using
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the additional assumption that the optimal choice is monotone with respect to the unobserved
nonseparable shock (as in quantile regression), the relevance is sufficient to recover identification.
Indeed, I show that there exists a unique monotone function identified by the system, while if I had
proceeded pointwise, uniqueness would have not held. By proceeding pointwise, other studies men-
tioned above need either stronger assumptions on the effect of the instrument (often regarding the
rank of a matrix of the probabilities of selecting into treatment with respect to the instrument) or
a different, less general setup for the selection mechanism (e.g., an additive process). To the best of
my knowledge, Vuong and Xu (2017) are the only other authors to exploit the power of monotonicity
in a similar fashion as I do for identification. However, they use it to relax strict monotonicity and
still maintain a strong rank condition on the effect of the instrument on the selection process, while
I am as general as possible with my mild condition of relevance. By developing a framework where
the optimal choices take the form of a triangular simultaneous system of equations, I establish a
connection and show how one can use the results from this literature on reduced-form identification
to identify more general dynamic structural models.
I also contribute to the literature on faster estimation methods that avoid the computation of
the value function (Rust, 1987; Hotz and Miller, 1993; Hotz et al., 1994; Carroll, 2006; Arcidiacono
and Miller, 2011; Iskhakov et al., 2017). I provide a faster alternative to indirect inference and the
most recent developments of endogenous grid methods (Iskhakov et al., 2017). A comparison of
different estimation methods can be found in section 6.
Finally, my application contributes to a large literature on labor market participation and con-
sumption, focusing on women. For example, see, Heckman and Macurdy (1980); Blundell et al.
(2016). Thanks to my method, I estimate the complete distribution of individual responses.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a general simultaneous discrete-continuous
choice framework. Section 3 discusses identification. Section 4 shows how dynamic models are em-
bedded in the framework. Section 5 describes the estimation method built on the constructive
identification arguments. Section 6 compares my novel method with existing methods using Monte-
Carlo simulations. Section 7 estimates an empirical discrete-continuous choice model of women’s
labor supply and consumption. Section 8 concludes the paper.
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2 Framework
I consider the general problem with the following timing where the agent:
Starts
with state z
Shocks (ε, η) Simultaneously
picks (d, cd)
The individual simultaneously selects a discrete action d ∈ D = {0, 1} and accordingly makes
one continuous choice cd ∈ Cd ⊂ R to maximize his payoff. The simultaneous decision is made
given some state z ∈ Z observed by the researcher, as well as two random preference shocks
ε = (ε0, ε1) ∈ E ⊂ R2 and η ∈ H ⊂ R that are unobserved by the econometrician. ε only affects the
discrete choice d, while η impacts the continuous choice c and the discrete choice. Note that the
same η impacts the continuous choice decision in both discrete states (c0 and c1). In other words,
I have rank invariance (Heckman et al., 1997; Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005), that is, η is not
discrete-choice specific.1 The payoffs of the agent are given by the function Vd(cd, z, η, ε). The agent
simultaneously selects d and cd to solve:
max
d,cd
Vd(cd, z, η, ε) (1)
I require additional assumptions for tractability and identification of the model.
Assumption 1 (Additive Separability) The shock ε enters the payoff additively such that ∀d ∈
{0, 1}:
Vd(cd, z, η, ε) = ṽd(cd, z, η) + εd.
The additive separability assumption is usual in the discrete choice model literature (Rust, 1987;
Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011). It applies to ε, while η can still enter the payoff in a nonseparable
manner. A consequence of Assumption 1 is that the optimal continuous policy functions will not
1In theory, the continuous choices could even represent different variables depending on the discrete option selected:
for example, if d represents the choice between working and studying, c might represent the amount of time worked
and the effort of the student respectively, hence the possibly different support. The main restriction is that even if
they represent two different choices, these two continuous choices are impacted by the same unobserved shock η.
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depend directly on ε. Indeed, cd are defined as the (interior) solutions to the maximization of the
conditional payoff. Here, because of the additivity, we have that
cd = argmax
c
(ṽd(c, z, η) + εd) ⇐⇒ cd = argmax
c
ṽd(c, z, η).
Assumption 2 (Instrument) State z contains two kinds of variables z = (x,w), where x ∈ X
represent general state variables and w is an instrument such that ∀d ∈ {0, 1}:
ṽd(cd, z, η) = ṽd(cd, x, w, η) = vd(cd, x, η) +md(x,w, η).
The support W of w contains two different values, as D = {0, 1}.2
w is an ‘instrument’ to recover the optimal continuous policies. On the one hand, with the




(vd(c, x, η) +md(x,w, η) + εd) = argmax
c
vd(c, x, η)
On the other hand, it might still be relevant and impact the discrete choice.
Assumption 3 (Monotonicity) The conditional payoff functions are twice continuously differ-




Assumption 3 implies that, conditional on (D = d,X = x), the conditional optimal policy
function c∗d(η, x) is C1 and strictly increases with respect to η.3 It ensures that there will be a
one-to-one mapping from η ∈ H to cd ∈ Cd for all d and x. This kind of monotonicity condition
has been widely used for identification (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005; Bajari et al., 2007; Hong
and Shum, 2010). In a sense, it means that I only identify monotone effects of the unobserved
2w being binary is a minimal condition for identification when d is binary. You can have discrete or even continuous
w, the identification proof follows the same line, the md objects to be identified are just slightly different.
3Note Assumption 3 is equivalent to ∂2ṽd(cd, x, w, η)/(∂cd∂η) > 0. Indeed, because of additivity in Assumption
2:
















nonseparable source of heterogeneity (η, here). A very important implication of Assumption 3
is that this framework applies to problems where we observe continuous choices in each discrete
option. For example, it does not apply directly to the problem of an investor who decides whether
to invest (d = 1) or not (d = 0) and the corresponding investment conditional on investing (d = 1)
(Hong and Shum, 2010). Indeed, in this case, c∗0(h) = 0 for all h and it is not strictly increasing.
However, it would apply to a discrete choice of portfolio and corresponding conditional investment.
Similarly, it does not apply directly to the house construction problem of Murphy (2018), where
the agent only decides of his house size if he chooses to build one d = 1. However, this setup still
applies to a slightly modified version of the building problem where the discrete decision would be
to build (d = 1) or to buy (or rent) an existing house (d = 0), and cd would be the corresponding
house size/housing service.










D = d∗(X,W, η, ε)
.
With this triangular structure, there is a link between my general structure and (reduced-form)
systems of simultaneous equations (Chesher, 2003; Matzkin, 2008; Imbens and Newey, 2009), as
well as with the related literature on heterogeneous/quantile treatment effects (Chernozhukov and
Hansen, 2005; Vuong and Xu, 2017). To identify the structure, one needs to first identify the
choices. To identify the system of choices, I need additional assumptions on the shocks.
Assumption 4 (Independent of w) Conditional on X = x, the pair of shocks (ε, η) is indepen-
dent and identically distributed and is independent of W .
Assumption 5 (Independent Shocks) Conditional on X = x, the discrete choice-specific and
the continuous choice-specific shocks are independent of one another: η ⊥ ε
Assumption 6 (Continuous choice shock distribution) Conditional on X = x, the continu-
ous choice-specific shock η has an atomless distribution.
Normalization 1 (Continuous shock) Conditional on X = x, η is distributed as U(0, 1).
Assumption 7 (Discrete choice shock distribution) Conditional on X = x, the discrete choice-
specific shock ε has continuous support and is independent and identically distributed with continuous
distribution Fε|X=x(ε) over the full support R.
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Assumption 8 (Regularity) ∀d ∈ {0, 1},
∀(x,w, η) : max
c
vd(c, x, w, η) <∞.
Assumption 4 is an independence assumption between the shocks and the instrument, conditional
on the other observables X. Assumption 5 assumes independence between the two shocks. Both of
these assumptions are not as restrictive as they may appear. Indeed, note that the additive term
md(x,w, η) can be interpreted in two different ways that we cannot identify separately. First, in
Assumption 2, I describe md as an additive part of the payoff ṽd. Second, it can also be interpreted
as part of a more general additive discrete shock term ε̃d where ε̃d could depend on w, x and η, i.e.,
ε̃d(x,w, η) = md(x,w, η) + εd. Therefore, in this sense, the independence assumptions 4 and 5 on εd
are still general: we could have a general ε̃d that is not independent of z = (x,w) or η. Then, εd is
the remaining part of the discrete shock that is independent of η and w.
The main restriction is the exclusion restriction that η ⊥ W |X. It is crucial for the identification
to have the same distribution of η, regardless of the value of w.
The atomless Assumption 6 is made to obtain smooth conditional distributions of continuous
choices. Here, I cannot identify the distribution of η separately from the rest of the problem.
Therefore, as is standard in the literature (Blundell et al., 1997; Matzkin, 2003), I normalize it
to a uniform distribution, which represents the quantiles of any atomless continuous distribution
(conditional on X), in Normalization 1.
Assumption 7 is a regularity condition on the distribution of the discrete choice-specific shock.
Along with Assumption 7, Assumption 8 is another regularity condition on the functional form that
ensures that 0 < Pr(d|η, z) < 1 for all d, η, z. Indeed:
Pr(D = 0|η, z) = Pr
(
ε0 − ε1 > (max
c
ṽ1(c, z, η))− (max
c
ṽ0(c, z, η)) | η, z
)
.
By Assumption 7, ε0 − ε1 has full support R, independent of η (Assumption 5). By Assumption
8, the payoff functions difference is bounded. Thus, 0 < Pr(D = 0|η, z) < 1 ∀η, z. Since Pr(D =
1|η, z) = 1− Pr(D = 0|η, z), we have that:
∀d, η, z 0 < Pr(d|η, z) < 1.
Similar to the distribution of η, the distribution of ε will not be identified in my setup. Thus,
I need to assume that this distribution is known. Therefore, in practice, I will later follow the
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literature on (static or dynamic) discrete choice models (McFadden, 1980; Rust, 1987; Hotz and
Miller, 1993; Matzkin, 1993; Magnac and Thesmar, 2002; Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011) and assume
(generalized) extreme-value distributions. This family of distributions is convenient as it yields
closed-form solutions linking the conditional value functions and the choice probabilities.4 However,
other distributions can be used (Chiong et al., 2016).
We need one last (testable) condition under which the framework is identified.
Assumption 9 (Instrument Relevance)
Assumption 9a For any x ∈ X , the additive terms of the payoff are such that there is, at most,
a finite set of K (with 0 ≤ K <∞) values h of η such that
m0(x,w = 0, h)−m1(x,w = 0, h) = m0(x,w = 1, h)−m1(x,w = 1, h).
Assumption 9b For any x ∈ X , there exist two different values of w, denoted w = 0 and w = 1,
for which the additive terms of the payoff are such that there is, at most, a finite set of K (with
0 ≤ K <∞) values h of η such that
Pr(D = 0|η = h, x,W = 1)− Pr(D = 0|η = h, x,W = 0) = 0.
Identification of the optimal policies requires that the instrument is sufficiently relevant. As
stated in Assumption 9: there must be at most a finite set of values of η at which the instrument is
not relevant for identification. In other words,m0(w = 0, x, h)−m1(w = 0, x, h) 6= m0(w = 1, x, h)−
m1(w = 1, x, h) or Pr(D = 0|η = h, x,W = 1) 6= Pr(D = 0|η = h, x,W = 0) except at most at a
finite set of values h. If this is the case, the instrument provides sufficient information to identify
the continuous policies. This condition is fairly intuitive and is considerably less restrictive than
full rank assumptions and other assumptions made for the identification of heterogeneous/quantile
treatment effects (Newey and Powell, 2003; Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005, 2006, 2008). As
shown later in the identification proof, the idea is that by fully exploiting the monotonicity of the
conditional continuous choices, full rank conditions on the selection process with respect to the
instrument are more restrictive than necessary for their identification. A similar intuition about
the power of monotonicity can be found in Vuong and Xu (2017). Note that Condition 9b has
4Notice that generalized extreme-value distributions implicitely eliminates the possible dependence of the distri-
bution of ε on X. Dependence is allowed, but as the distribution is not identified anyway, one usually abstracts from
it in practice.
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testable implications for the observed reduced forms. It allows to test whether the structural model
is identified, I will discuss this in the next section.
Lemma 1 (Equivalence) Under Assumptions 2, 4 and 5, Assumptions 9a and 9b are equivalent.
Proof. By construction:





v1(c, x, η))− (max
c
v0(c, x, η))
+ m1(x,w, η)−m0(x,w, η)





v0(c, x, η)) is independent of w (Assumption 2) and since εd ⊥ (w, η)|x
(Assumptions 4 and 5), we have that:
Pr(D = 0|η, x, w = 0) 6= Pr(D = 0|η, x, w = 1)
⇐⇒ m0(x,w = 0, η)−m1(x,w = 0, η) 6= m0(x,w = 1, η)−m1(x,w = 1, η).
Thus, Assumption 9a expressed in terms of structural forms is equivalent to Assumption 9b on the
optimal conditional choice probabilities.
Summary of the setup:




vd(cd, x, η) + md(x,w, η) + εd.
The general setup described here can apply not only to a wide range of static but also dynamic
discrete-continuous choice models. I provide one static example below, and I will describe how
it embeds dynamic models in section 4. The idea is that, in the dynamic case, vd represents the
current conditional value functions, embedding the expectations about the future, as in Hotz and
Miller (1993).
Example 1: Static demand for energy
In the spirit of Dubin and McFadden (1984), consider the demand for energy with discrete appliance
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choice. The agent simultaneously decides between two energy sources d = 0 or 1 and the corre-
sponding amount of energy she will consume (cd). x contains observable information about the cost
of each energy source and possibly the wealth or income of the agents. εd represents individual-
specific unobserved preferences for each energy type. η could represent some other unobserved
characteristics of the consumer impacting both her preference for the energy type and the amount
of energy she wants to consume. The higher η is, the higher cd for all d.
In practice, the greatest challenge is to find a good instrument w. Here, a good w could be
some variable about the accessibility of each energy alternative. For example, the previous alter-
native selected by the individual might be a good instrument. First, conditional on the present
alternative choice (d) and on current wealth (included in x), the past (w) should have no impact on
the current energy consumption level (cd). Thus, it would be an exogenous instrument. Moreover,
changing alternatives is costly in terms of time, so individuals who were previously using energy 0
are less likely to use energy 1 now than their counterparts who were already using it. In this case,
the agent incurs some disutility cost of switching from one alternative to the other and no cost if
he does not switch. In other words, for all x and h, for alternative 1, m1(x,w = 0, h) < 0 and
m1(x,w = 1, h) = 0, and for alternative 0 m0(x,w = 0, h) = 0 and m0(x,w = 1, h) < 0. In this
case, m0(x,w = 0, h)−m0(x,w = 1, h) > 0 and m1(x,w = 0, h)−m1(x,w = 1, h) < 0, so they are
different, and the instrument is relevant (Assumption 9).
Discussion of Simultaneity:
My general simultaneous choice framework nests the non-simultaneous timings where either the
discrete or continuous choice is taken before and based on expectations about the other choice (and
its shock realization). These two timings have testable implications for the optimal choices within
the simultaneous framework:
• If the discrete choice is taken first, before the realization of η and the continuous choice, then
the CCP Pr(D = d|η,X,W ) is independent of η. Indeed, η is not yet realized. The discrete
choice is only based on expectations about η and the corresponding c∗d(x, η).
• Conversely, if the continuous choice is made first, before the discrete choice and the realization
of ε, then the CCCs c∗d(x, η) are independent of d, i.e., c∗0(x, η) = c∗1(x, η) ∀η.
Since I identify the policy functions c∗d and Pr(D = 1|η,X,W ) in the simultaneous framework, I
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can test the timing of the model.
In the next section, I study the identification of the discrete-continuous choice model.
3 Identification
I observe data on the variables (D,Cd, X,W ). I only observe C0 if D = 0 and C1 if D = 1. For
all (x,w, η) in X ×W ×H, I study non-parametric identification of the following objects: the opti-
mal Conditional Continuous Choices (CCCs) c∗d(η, x), the optimal Conditional Choice Probabilities
(CCPs) Pr(d|η, w, x) for d = 0 and d = 1, and the indirect payoff functions (taken at the optimal
c) max
c
vd(c, x, η) and md(x,w, η). Without loss of generality, in this section, I focus on any given x
value and omit x from what follows. This is not an issue because x is exogenous in this problem, and
my assumptions about the distribution of the shocks are conditional on X = x. First, I characterize
the reduced forms and constraints imposed by the structure. Then, I discuss the identification of
the optimal policies (CCCs and CCPs) and of the payoffs.
3.1 Reduced forms and constraints
In the data, I observe (d, cd, w). w is exogenous in the model while cd and d are endogenous choices.
There is a fundamental observability problem, as I only observe one value of cd depending on the
discrete choice selected:
cd = c0(1− d) + c1d.
I do not observe both ‘potential outcomes’, only the selected one. Therefore, from the data, I recover
the distribution of c conditional on d and w. I denote it FCd|d,w(cd) = Pr(Cd ≤ cd|D = d,W = w). I
also recover the conditional probability of selecting d knowing w, denoted as pd|w = Pr(D = d|W =
w). In other words, the data provide us with the following reduced-form functions, which exhaust
all relevant information:
R = {{pd|w}(d,w)∈{0,1}×{0,1}, {FCd|d,w(cd)}∀cd∈Cd,(d,w)∈{0,1}×{0,1}}.
An important vocabulary remark is in order: in this paper, Pr(D = d|W = w) is part of the reduced
forms, while Pr(D = d|η = h,W = w) is what I call the conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) or
selection on unobservables (η) that I want to identify. This differs from the dynamic discrete choice
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literature, where Pr(D = d|W = w) are actually called CCPs (Hotz and Miller, 1993; Arcidiacono
and Miller, 2011). However, here, I have simultaneous choices and a nonseparable shock η, which
affects both choices. Thus, the true counterparts to the usual CCPs are Pr(D = d|η = h,W = w)
for all d and not Pr(D = d|W = w), hence the different terminology.
Now let us see the constraints implied by the structure on the reduced forms.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 3-8 of the structural model, the distribution FCd|d,w(cd): Cd → [0, 1]
is C1 and strictly increasing.
Proof. The distribution of η is C1 and strictly increasing (Assumption 6). As previously explained,
under Assumptions 5, 7 and 8, the probability of selecting d knowing η = h is different from zero
(or one) for all h and for both w (i.e., 0 < Pr(d|h,w) < 1). As a consequence, the distribution
function of η conditional on d and w is also C1 and strictly increasing. Now, note that, by the
monotonicity Assumption 3, the distribution functions of cd (conditional on w) are strictly monotone
transformations of the distribution of η|d. In other words:
Pr(η ≤ h |d, w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Fη|d,w(h)





Therefore, since Fη|d,w(h) is C1 and strictly increasing (with respect to h), FCd|d,w(c
∗
d(h)) is also C1
and strictly increasing (with respect to h). Now, since c∗d(h) are C1 and strictly increase with re-
spect to h (Assumption 3), FCd|d,w(cd) are also C
1 and strictly increase with respect to cd for all d.
Lemma 2 provides some regularity conditions on the distributions generated by the structural form.
The fact that FCd|d,w(cd) are C
1 is helpful for the testable conditions of our model provided in what
follows.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 9b in which K is defined, there is the same finite number K of values
of c0 and c1 such that
d







Under the relevance Assumption 9, there is only a finite number K of values h of η such that
the instrument has no effect Pr(d|η = h,w = 1) = Pr(d|η = h,w = 0). I will show that when
this happens, we have d(Pr(η ≤ h|d,W = 1) − Pr(η ≤ h|d,W = 0))/dh = 0. Now, by the
monotonicity of the optimal continuous choice, the observed conditional distributions of Cd|d are
transformations of the unobserved conditional distribution of η|d. Therefore, even if we do not
observe the conditional distribution of η|d, we know that if the instrument is sufficiently relevant
(Assumption 9), Lemma 3 will be fulfilled.
Lemma 3 yields observable and testable implications on the reduced forms. Indeed, the functions
∆Fcd(cd) are directly observable for all d, as is d∆Fcd(cd)/dcd (the derivative is well defined, cf
Lemma 2). It can be used to test the relevance Assumption 9 that is crucial for identification. The
idea is that if the function ∆Fcd(cd) is flat on a segment of values of cd, then there is a segment of
values of η such that the instrument is not relevant. In this case, the instrument has no differential
impact on the conditional choice probabilities, so it does not help to identify the optimal continuous
policy. If this is the case, the model is not point identified for this segment of η.
Lemmas 2 and 3 fully characterize the impact of my structure on the reduced forms. With
these reduced forms, one would like to identify the structural form, i.e., the values of the payoffs
vd(c
∗
d(h), h) (taken at the optimal continuous choice) and md(w, h).
The difficulty for the identification is that the shock η is unobserved and nonseparable. As a
consequence, there is an unobserved variable that affects every structural object we would like to
identify: the conditional payoffs vd(c∗d(h), h) and md(w, h), the optimal discrete choice d∗(h,w, ε),
the corresponding conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) Pr(d|h,w) = Eε[d∗(h,w, ε)|h,w] and the
optimal conditional continuous choices c∗d(h) (CCCs) for all d. Thus, I first need to back out the
value h of η. To do so, I will first identify the conditional continuous choices c∗d(h) from the reduced
forms R by exploiting monotonicity, Bayes’ law and the relevant instrument w. Then, I will use
monotonicity to identify η from the data by inverting the monotone c∗d(h): h = (c∗d)−1(cd). Once I
identify the values h of the shock η, I can identify the conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) of
selecting alternative d knowing η = h,w: Pr(d|h,w). Then, I use these Pr(d|h,w) as in Hotz and
Miller (1993) to identify the difference in payoffs between the two alternatives. Finally, I discuss
identification of the payoffs under additional structural assumptions in the next section.
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3.2 Identification of Conditional Continuous Choices (CCCs)
Difficulty: observability problem
As in the literature on continuous choices (Matzkin, 2003; Bajari et al., 2007; Hong and Shum,
2010), I would like to exploit the monotonicity Assumption 3 to identify the optimal continuous
choices. For any value of w, by monotonicity, we have that
Pr(η ≤ h |d) = Pr(Cd ≤ c∗d(h) |d) ∀d
under Lemma 2⇐⇒ c∗d(h) = F−1Cd|d(Pr(η ≤ h|d)) ∀d.
Thus, if we knew the distribution of η conditional on d, we could recover the optimal conditional
continuous choices c∗d(h) by using the monotonicity of the conditional distribution of Cd knowing d
to invert it. However, here we only know the unconditional distribution of η (by Assumption 6).5
The conditional distributions of η|d are unobserved. They depend on an unobserved selection mech-
anism: Pr(η ≤ h|d) = Pr(d|η ≤ h)Pr(η ≤ h)/Pr(d). Because of this selection with simultaneous
discrete and continuous choices, we cannot use usual inversion methods based on monotonicity for
identification.
Another way to see the problem would be the following. Knowing that η is uniform and inde-
pendent of observables (Assumptions 4 and 6), we have:
Pr(η ≤ h) =
unobserved︷ ︸︸ ︷
Pr(Cd ≤ c∗d(h)) ∀d
= Pr(Cd ≤ c∗d(h); (D = 0 ∪D = 1))
= Pr(C0 ≤ c∗0(h); D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
observed
+Pr(C0 ≤ c∗0(h); D = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unobserved
= Pr(C1 ≤ c∗1(h); D = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unobserved
+Pr(C1 ≤ c∗1(h); D = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
observed
.
Imagine that we observed both c0 and c1 for every individual, independently of the discrete choice
d, i.e., if D = 0 or D = 1 is selected, we observe both c0 and c1. Then, we observe the unconditional
distribution of c∗d(h): Pr(Cd ≤ c∗d(h)). In this case, knowing that η is uniform, one could exploit




However, here again, we observe c0 if D = 0 and c1 if D = 1. Because of this selection, we cannot
5Note that instead of normalizing the unconditional distribution, we could normalize the functional form of one
of the conditional η|d distributions. η|D=0 ∼ U(0, 1) for example. However, the problem would be the same, as we
still would not know the distribution of the other conditional shock η|D=1.
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identify the optimal continuous choice policies.
Identification via the instrument:
Instead, to identify c∗d(h), I use the properties of the instrument (Assumption 2) to obtain structural
restrictions. Using Bayes’ law we have, ∀h ∈ [0, 1]:
h = Pr(η ≤ h)
= Pr(η ≤ h|w)
= Pr(η ≤ h | D = 0, w)Pr(D = 0|w) + Pr(η ≤ h | D = 1, w)Pr(D = 1|w)
= Pr(c ≤ c∗0(h) | D = 0, w)Pr(D = 0|w)
+ Pr(c ≤ c∗1(h) | D = 1, w)Pr(D = 1|w)
= FC0|D=0,w(c
∗






where the first equality comes from the fact that η ∼ U [0, 1] by normalization. The second follows
because η ⊥ w by Assumption 4. The third equality comes from the law of total probability. The







1(h))p1|w ∀h ∈ [0, 1] ∀w ∈ {0, 1}. (2)













Thanks to the instrument, we have a system of two equations to identify two unknown increasing
functions. The role of the instrument and Assumption 2 is now clearer. The instrument being ex-
ogenous to cd is crucial here, otherwise, we would have two equations with four unknown functions:
c∗0(h,W = 0), c
∗
0(h,W = 1), c
∗
1(h,W = 0), c
∗
1(h,W = 1), which would not be identified. Similarly,
without a relevant instrument (i.e., if d ⊥ w), the distributions conditional on w would be the same
(i.e., p0|0 = p0|1 and FCd|d,W=0(c) = FCd|d,W=1(c)), so the two equations would in fact contain exactly
the same information.
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Identification problem: Let the reduced form be described as:
R = {{pd|w}(d,w)∈{0,1}×{0,1}, {FCd|d,w(cd)}∀cd∈Cd,(d,w)∈{0,1}×{0,1}}
The conditional continuous choice (CCCs) policy functions are identified if and only if there exists
a unique set of structural functions {cd(h)}∀h∈[0,1],d∈{0,1} strictly increasing with respect to h, which
satisfies equation (2), and is compatible with R.
Theorem 1 (Identification) For any reduced form drawn from the structural model, there exist
unique conditional continuous choice (CCC) functions cd(h) (for d = 0 and d = 1) mapping [0, 1]
into Cd, which are strictly increasing and solve the system of equations (2):
h = FC0|D=0,w(c0(h))p0|w + FC1|D=1,w(c1(h))p1|w ∀h ∈ [0, 1] ∀w ∈ {0, 1}.
As a consequence, the optimal CCCs, c∗d(h) for d = 0 and d = 1, are point identified from the
reduced form R as the unique increasing solutions to the identification problem.
Proof. The complete proof appears in Appendix B.
Sketch of the proof:
Existence of the solution is trivial: since the reduced forms are drawn from the structural model,
the true c∗d(h) will be the solution to our system of equations (2) by construction.
What is more difficult to prove is the uniqueness of the solution. First, we show that the mapping
between the conditional continuous choices, denoted c̃0(c1), is identified from the reduced forms.
Once we have it, using system (2), it is trivial to show that the continuous policies are also identified.






















⇐⇒ ∆FC0(c∗0(h)) = −∆FC1(c∗1(h)),
where ∆FCd(c) are directly observed from the data, and are C1 as a sum of C1 functions (Lemma
2). However, the problem is that h is unobserved. Now, even without observing h, if two conditional
choices c̃0 and c̃1 correspond to the same unobserved h, we will have: ∆FC0(c̃0) = ∆FC1(c̃1). Thus,
for the true mapping c̃0(c1) between the two continuous conditional choices we will have
∀c1 ∆FC0(c̃0(c1)) = −∆FC1(c1). (3)
20
The mapping is identified if and only if there exists a unique function c̃0(c1) solution to equation
(3). What are these ∆FCd(c) functions? They are observable C1 functions (Lemma 2). They are





Pr(D = d|η = h̃,W = 1)− Pr(D = d|η = h̃,W = 0)
)
dh̃.











Which is what we had by rewriting system (2). However, it is very important: it means that ∆FC0(c)
and −∆FC1(c) are transformations (through unknown c∗d(h)) of the same underlying object, which
is based on the difference in conditional choice probabilities Pr(D = 0|η = h,W = 1) − Pr(D =
0|η = h,W = 0). Thus, by construction, ∆FC0(c) and −∆FC1(c) will go ‘through the same values,
in the same order’, just not at the same ‘speed’. The shape of ∆FCd is directly determined by
the difference in conditional choice probabilities, hence the reason why we make our identification
Assumption 9 on these probabilities directly.
Now, take the easier case where Pr(D = 0|η = h,W = 1) > Pr(D = 0|η = h,W = 0)
for all h.6 In other words, the identification Assumption 9 is satisfied with K = 0. Equation
(4) implies that ∆FC0(c0) and −∆FC1(c1) will be strictly increasing from Pr(D = 0|η = 0,W =





Pr(D = 0|η = h̃,W = 1)−Pr(D = 0|η = h̃,W = 0)
)
dh̃ at the maximum values of c0
and c1 (corresponding to c∗0(1) and c∗1(1)). ∆FCd(cd) are thus C1 and strictly monotone: they are
invertible. In this case, the unique mapping between c0 and c1 is obtained by inverting equation
(3):





The solution exists and is unique. Thus c̃0(c1) is identified in this case.
Now, we can show that the continuous policies are still identified even if ∆FCd(cd) are not
strictly monotone but only piecewise monotone. This is the general case covered by our identi-
fication Assumption 9: if there exists a finite set of K > 0 (and K < ∞) values of h at which
6Obviously, the same reasoning applies in the reverse case where Pr(D = 0|η = h,W = 1) < Pr(D = 0|η =
h,W = 0) for all h.
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Pr(D = 0|η = h,W = 1) = Pr(D = 0|η = h,W = 0), then by equation (4), we can show that
∆FCd(cd) are piecewise monotone. Piecewise monotonicity is not a problem for identification here.
We are not solving equation (3) point by point, in which case there could exist several solutions for
some values of c1. Instead, we are solving for the entire monotone policy functions c∗d(h) directly.
Therefore, even if pointwise there might exist several solutions, there exists a unique monotone
function on the whole support of c1 that solves equation (3). In practice, we first identify these
K points at which d∆FCd(cd)/dcd = 0 (Lemma 3). We know that these points are increasingly
matched together by construction. Then, we split the support of c0 and c1 accordingly. On the
subsegments, ∆FCd(cd) are strictly monotone and C1, thus invertible. Therefore, we can recover
the mapping piece by piece.
The only case in which identification does not hold is when ∆FCd are flat on some segment.
This corresponds to the case where our identification assumption 9 is violated, and the instrument
is not relevant to a set of nonnull masses. In this case, we only have partial identification of the
policy functions: they are point identified everywhere outside of the flat segment (on which there
is an infinite number of possible mappings between c1 and c0).
Once we identify the mapping c̃0(c1), we can recover the policies using any equation of the initial
system (2), as:
∀c1 h(c1) = FC0|D=0,W=0(c̃0(c1))p0|0 + FC1|D=1,W=0(c1)p1|0.
Thus we have a unique increasing solution (h(c1), c̃0(c1))∀c1 ∈ C1. Since everything is increasing,
we can simply change the arguments to obtain the unique solution (c∗0(h), c∗1(h)) ∀h ∈ [0, 1].
One of the main take-aways from this the proof is that, with this setup, by exploiting knowledge
about the monotonicity of the optimal continuous policies and directly solving for the complete
function, I identify the policies with assumptions that are considerably less restrictive than what
is usually imposed in related studies. For example, full rank assumptions on the effect of the
instrument on the selection in identification of IV quantile treatment effects (Newey and Powell,
2003; Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005, 2006, 2008) are too strong in this framework. In fact, even
my subcase where K = 0 was already less restrictive than full rank, for example. There is one
notable exception of Vuong and Xu (2017), who are also solving for a complete function and not
pointwise. However, they choose to use this method to relax strict monotonicity (and still impose
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some constraint on the conditional choice probabilities), while I use it to be as agnostic as possible
about the conditional choice probabilities. My main identification requirement is to have a relevant
instrument (Assumption 9), which seems fairly natural. Moreover, it is testable by observations of
the ∆FCd(cd) functions: as long as they are not flat, the policies are identified.
3.3 Identification of Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs)
Now that the conditional continuous choices (CCCs) are identified, I can directly identify the
conditional choice probabilities (CCPs). Indeed, knowing the strictly monotone (and invertible)
(c∗0(h), c
∗
1(h))∀h, one can recover h from observing (d, cobsd ). If D = d,
h = (c∗d)
−1(cobsd ).
From there, it is as if η = h were observed. I observe (d, cd, w, h) from the data. Thus, I can directly
recover the conditional choice probabilities:
∀(d, w, h) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} × [0, 1] : Pr(D = d|η = h,W = w).
Thus, the CCPs are identified once h is recovered from inverting the CCCs.
Inclusion of unobserved types in the model
The fact that η acts as an observed covariate once the CCCs are identified is crucial. Thanks to
this, one can apply standard methods from the dynamic discrete choice literature where η would be
among the observed covariates. This means that once η is identified, one could include unobserved
state variables/types in the framework as in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). The non-parametric
identification is given by Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) or Hu and Shum (2012).
3.4 Identification of the payoffs
Now that the optimal policy choices are identified, we can proceed to identify the structural model,
i.e., the payoff functions vd(c∗d(h), h) and md(w, h). First, I focus on the identification of the differ-
ences in payoff between the discrete alternatives.
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Identification of the differences in payoffs:
The conditional choice probabilities are identified in the data. We can use them with our structural
assumptions to identify difference in payoffs in the model. We know that the CCPs are related to
the structure of the model as follows:
Pr(D = 0|η = h,w) = Pr
(
ε0 − ε1 > (max
c
v1(c, h) +m1(w, h))− (max
c








where v∗d(h) ≡ vd(c∗d(h), h) = max
c
v1(c, h).
If the distribution of ε0− ε1 is known (and invertible), given that we know the CCPs, the difference
in payoffs will also be identified. As is standard in the discrete choice literature, identification
depends on the distribution of the difference in ε here.
For example, let us assume that ε follows a Gumbel/extreme-value type-I distribution(with lo-
cation 0 and scale 1), as is commonly used in the discrete choice literature (McFadden, 1980; Hotz
and Miller, 1993). In this case, we are in the logistic regression scenario and we have:



















Moreover, since v∗d(h) are independent of w by Assumption 2, we can also identify the difference in
the effect of the instrument :














The differences in payoffs are also non-parametrically identified for other distributions of ε. Ap-
plications often use generalized-extreme value distributions as they yield easily tractable closed-form
solutions (Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011), but other distributions are possible.
Identification of the payoffs:
To non-parametrically identify the payoffs directly using the CCPs and CCCs, one needs to add
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some structure to the problem. In other words, we need additional behavioural conditions to know
how the agents behave. For example, by considering the framework applied to dynamic problems, I
can use the identification power of the first-order conditions/Euler equation to non-parametrically
directly identify the payoffs using the identified CCPs and CCCs. This is what I do in the next
section by extending the framework to a dynamic setup.
4 Extension to Dynamic models
The general framework that I developed embeds dynamic models: vdt must simply be understood
as current conditional value functions, embedding expectations about the future. Here, I show
how general (non-stationary) dynamic models of agents enter the setup and are non-parametrically
identified (in the spirit of Blundell et al., 1997). The model is very general and nests many life-cycle
empirical applications of interest (e.g., Blundell et al., 2016; Iskhakov et al., 2017).
4.1 Dynamic Life-Cycle Framework of Labor and Consumption
In this section, I describe how a general dynamic model of labor and consumption choices enters
the general framework described in section 2.
Each period t until T , the timing of the problem is as follows:
t
t t+ t++ t+1
Starts
with states
zt = (xt, wt)




The current period conditional utility for action (d, cd) at time t is given by:
Udt(cdt, xt, wt, ηt, εt). (5)
In this example, ct is consumption, and cdt are conditional consumptions, with ct = c0t(1−dt)+c1tdt.
dt is the work decision (Blundell et al., 1997, 2016). xt represents all the covariates. These include
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covariates impacting current utility such as age, education and other demographics. For notational
convenience, xt also include variables such as asset or income that do not necessarily directly impact
preferences but still have an impact on consumption choice (and labor choice), notably through their
transitions. wt is again the instrumental variable that must fulfil some conditions I describe below.
I impose some conditions on current utility which are necessary (not sufficient) for the dynamic
setup described here to fit into the structure described in section 2.
Assumption D1 (Additive Separability) The shock εt enters the payoff additively such that:
Udt(cdt, xt, wt, ηt, εt) = ũdt(cdt, xt, wt, ηt) + εdt.
Assumption D2 (Instrument) wt ∈ W = {0, 1} is an instrumental variable such that
ũdt(cdt, xt, wt, ηt) = udt(cdt, xt, ηt) +mdt(xt, wt, ηt).
Assumption D3 (Monotonicity) The conditional current utility functions are twice continu-
ously differentiable such that
∂2udt(cdt, xt, ηt)
∂cdt∂ηt
> 0 ∀dt, cdt, xt, ηt
Transitions:
In a dynamic context, the individual chooses (dt, cdt) to maximize not only her current utility but
also to maximize her expected discounted sum of future payoffs. She discounts the future period
utilities at a rate β. In this context, the agent form rational expectations about the transition proba-
bilities. These transitions from (xt, wt, εt, ηt) and the current choices (ct, dt) to (xt+1, wt+1, εt+1, ηt+1)
matter for the choices. In particular, how the current choices impact these transitions is especially
important for the optimal choice decision. The impacts of the choices on the transitions are often
expressed through a budget constraint like
at+1 = (1 + rt)at − ct + ytdt.
For now I stay more general and simply assume the existence of general transitions of states and
errors which depend on the choices:
ft(xt+1, wt+1, εt+1, ηt+1|ct, dt, xt, wt, εt, ηt).
I need to make additional assumptions on these transitions for the setup to be identified (and to
enter the general framework).
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Assumption 10 (Conditional Independence) For all xt ∈ X , wt ∈ W, εt ∈ E, ηt ∈ H, we
have:
ft(xt+1, wt+1, εt+1, ηt+1|ct, dt, xt, wt, εt, ηt) = ft(xt+1, wt+1|ct, dt, xt, wt) fε(εt+1) fη(ηt+1).
Assumption 11 (Instrument Transition Exclusion) For all xt ∈ X , wt ∈ W, the current
instrument is excluded from the transitions, i.e.,
ft(xt+1, wt+1|ct, dt, wt, xt) = ft(xt+1, wt+1|ct, dt, xt).
Solution:
Knowing these transition probabilities, the individual chooses (dt, cdt) to sequentially maximize her
expected discounted sum of payoffs. Let us define Vt(zt) = Vt(xt, wt) as the (ex ante) value function
of this discounted sum of future payoffs at the beginning of t, just before the shocks (εt, ηt) are






[ udτ (cdτ , xτ , ητ ) +md(xτ , wτ , ητ ) + εdτ ]
]
.
Given the state variable zt and choice (d, cdt) in period t, the expected value function in period t+1
is




By the conditional independence Assumption 10 and instrument exclusion from the transition (As-
sumption 11), we can remove wt from the conditioning variables, which yields:










udt(cdt, xt, ηt) +mdt(xt, wt, ηt) + εdt + βEzt+1 [Vt+1(zt+1)|xt, cdt, dt]
] ]
.




udt(cdt, xt, ηt) + βEzt+1 [Vt+1(zt+1)|xt, cdt, dt] +mdt(xt, wt, ηt) + εdt.
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Denote the conditional value functions vdt as:
vdt(cdt, xt, ηt) ≡ udt(cdt, xt, ηt) + βEzt+1 [Vt+1(zt+1)|xt,cdt,dt ]. (6)
So that we return to our general setup. Indeed, the dynamic model can be interpreted as a static
model, where in every period the agent selects dt and cdt to solve:
max
dt,cdt
vdt(cdt, xt, ηt) +mdt(xt, wt, ηt) + εdt.
Lemma 4 (Dynamic Framework) Under Assumptions D1, D2, D3, 10 and 11, Assumptions
1, 2 and 3 are satisfied for the conditional value functions defined in equation (6) in the dynamic
setup.
The other Assumptions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 as well as Normalization 1 are imposed contemporane-
ously (with index t) and unconditionally on Xt (for simplicity).
If Assumption D1 holds for the current utility function, Assumption 1 will hold for the con-
ditional value functions by construction in equation (6). Assumptions D2 and D3 on the current
utility do not translate directly into Assumptions 2 and 3 for the conditional value function. One
needs additional assumptions about the transitions, i.e., Assumptions 10 and 11.
Conditional independence assumptions are standard for the identification and empirical tractabil-
ity of dynamic discrete choice models (Rust, 1987; Blevins, 2014). Here, Assumption 10 implies
that the transitions of the state variables are independent of the shocks (εt, ηt). Similarly, the shock
transitions are independent of the variables here. There is no time dependence on the shocks, which
are thus iid every period. Note that one can include some unobserved heterogeneous types cor-
related over time in the covariates following Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). This allows for some
unobserved auto-correlation in the unobservables and attenuates the strength of the conditional
independence.
Crucially, here, in addition to the standard conditional independence 10, Assumption 11 also im-
plies that conditional on (dt, ct, xt), the transitions are independent of the current instrument value
wt. In particular, the instrument is excluded from its own transition to future values, conditional
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on (dt, ct, xt), i.e.,
wt+1 ⊥ wt | ct, dt, xt ∀ct, dt, xt
or equivalently fw(wt+1|ct, dt, xt, wt) = fw(wt+1|ct, dt, xt).
It implies that instruments that are time independent wt = w for all t cannot be included. As-
sumption D2 combined with Assumption 11 will satisfy Assumption 2 on the conditional value as
stated in Lemma 4 and as shown in the computation above. However, if the exclusion of the instru-
ment from the transition (Assumption 11) does not hold, then wt affects the expected future value
function Ezt+1 [Vt+1(zt+1|xt, wt, cdt, dt] and enters the conditional value functions vdt in equation (6),
which are rewritten as vdt(cdt, xt, wt, ηt) for all d in this case. In this case, it is obvious that the
original exclusion of the instrument from vd in Assumption 2 is violated. Thus, the dynamic setup
does fit into the general framework of section 2 without Assumption 11.
Similarly, Assumption D3 is just a necessary condition for Assumption 3 to hold. I also require
the expectations about the future to be independent of current (ηt, εt). In this case, the monotonic-
ity Assumption 3 in the general framework is also satisfied. Indeed, if the future is independent of











Therefore, if the conditional independence and monotonicity of the current utility function hold
(Assumptions 10 and D3), then the monotonicity of the conditional value functions vdt (Assump-
tion 3) also holds.
Instrument example:
The question that remains is, what could be a good instrument satisfying this restrictive conditional
independence and exclusion from the transition in practice? In general, a good instrument would
be to allow for switching cost and to use wt = dt−1 in this setup. Indeed, in this case, the exclusion
assumption 11 is easily satisfied for the instrument: wt+1 is dt. Therefore, conditional on the cur-
rent dt choice, wt+1 is directly known. wt = dt−1 does not provide any additional information, so it
can be dropped from the conditioning variables in the transition. Moreover, it is unlikely that wt
provides any information about the other future covariates xt+1 after conditioning on the current
dt. Similarly, conditional on xt, which could include for example, the experience of the individual,
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it is unlikely that dt−1 has an impact on udt. The exclusion restriction D2 is satisfied. Finally, we
just need the instrument to be relevant (Assumption 9). This would be the case if one had some
utility switching cost from entering or exiting the workforce for example.7 In this case, we would
have: m0t(xt, wt = 0, ηt) −m1t(xt, wt = 0, ηt) 6= m0t(xt, wt = 1, ηt) −m1t(xt, wt = 1, ηt). And the
instrument would be relevant.
Relaxing time independence of η:
One can loosen Assumption 10 and allow for first-order time dependence in ηt in this setup. In
other words, I can have fη(ηt|ηt−1). In fact, as I identify ηt separately for all t, I can identify
these transitions, which are particularly interesting in some applications (e.g., if η represents some
unobserved ability or productivity). The only problem is that it is more difficult to find a good
instrument in practice in this case. Indeed, in the presence of auto-correlation in ηt, wt = dt−1 is no
longer a good instrument, as it violates its independence from ηt in the initial period (Assumption
4). Indeed, in the initial period of the data, η−1 is not observed and is correlated with η0. However,
in this case, d−1 was a choice taken based on η−1 and thus correlated with η−1. Therefore, in the first
period, w0 = d−1 is correlated with η−1 and thus with η0. The instrument w0 is not independent
of η0, which violates Assumption 4. If we were able to condition on ηt−1, we could identify ηt:
conditional on ηt−1, wt = dt−1 ⊥ ηt. However, there is no way to recover η−1 which is outside the
sample. Thus, I cannot allow for transition in ηt with wt = dt−1 as an instrument. Therefore,
the best way to account for unobserved auto-correlation with wt = dt−1 as an instrument would
be to include unobserved types à la Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) in the model and still impose
conditional independence with an iid ηt.
If there exists another instrument satisfying Assumptions 4, D2 and 11, then one can allow for
auto-correlated ηt. In fact, even if such an instrument is available only in one period t0 (e.g., a
unique unexpected event), then one can still allow for auto-correlation in ηt. Indeed, one can use
the instrument in the period to identify the ηt0 . For all the following periods, wt = dt−1 can be used
as a proper instrument if I include ηt−1 in the covariates list.
7Alternatively, one could have some auto-correlation in dt. Recall thatmdt() can be interpreted as some observable
part of the εt shocks. Thus, the relevance assumption with wt = dt−1 could also be interpreted as the existence of
auto-correlation in a general ε̃t term, with
ε̃dt = mdt(xt, wt, ηt) + εdt.
Thus, the assumption about no correlation in εt is less restrictive than it seems.
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4.2 Identification of the dynamic model
First, I show how the CCCs and CCPs are identified in this dynamic model. Then, I show how the
payoffs are also non-parametrically identified under additional assumptions.
4.2.1 Optimal choices: CCCs and CCPs
Under Lemma 4, the dynamic framework described in Section 4 fits into the general framework de-
scribed in Section 2. Therefore the CCCs and CCPs are identified period by period following exactly
the same proof I developed in the previous section. In other words, from data on (Dt, Ct, Xt,Wt, t),
I recover reduced forms
R =
{




From these reduced forms, following Section 3, I identify the CCCs and CCPs
c∗dt(x, η = h) and Pr(d|η = h, x, w, t) ∀d ∈ {0, 1}, w ∈ {0, 1}, h ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ Xt, t ∈ {0, ..., T}.
Special case: identification of the choices with terminal/absorbing actions
Imagine dt = 1 is a terminal action or an absorbing state. For example dt = 1 if the individual
retires, dt = 0 if she stays active. Assuming that an individual cannot go back to the working
life, the retirement choice is absorbing (Iskhakov et al., 2017). In this case, assuming all the other
modeling assumptions still hold, identification is more direct and simpler. I still use wt = dt−1
as the instrument, so the Assumption 11 on the transitions is still verified. Now, conditional on
wt = 1, an individual only has the choice to stay retired, i.e., dt = 1. Thus, focus on previously
retired individuals (Wt = 1), we have:
h = Pr(ηt ≤ h|Xt,Wt = 1, t)
= Pr(ηt ≤ h|Dt = 1, Xt,Wt = 1, t)
= Pr(c ≤ c∗1t(h,Xt)|Dt = 1, Xt,Wt = 1, t)
= FC1|Dt=1,Xt,Wt=1,t(c
∗
1t(h,Xt)) ∀Xt ∈ Xt, h ∈ [0, 1].
Since FC1|Dt=1,Xt,Wt=1,t(c) are invertible (Lemma 2), we recover the continuous choices conditional
on being retired as:
c∗1t(h,Xt) = F
−1
C1|Dt=1,Xt,Wt=1,t(h) ∀Xt ∈ Xt, h ∈ [0, 1].
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It remains to identify the other conditional continuous policy, and to do that one simply needs to




0t(h,Xt))Pr(Dt = 0|Xt,Wt = 0, t)
+ FC1|Dt=1,Xt,Wt=0,t(c
∗
1t(h,Xt))Pr(Dt = 1|Xt,Wt = 0, t)
⇐⇒ FC0|Dt=0,Xt,Wt=0,t(c∗0t(h,Xt)) =
h− FC1|Dt=1,Xt,Wt=0,t(c∗1t(h,Xt))Pr(Dt = 1|Xt,Wt = 0, t)
Pr(Dt = 0|Xt,Wt = 0, t)
⇐⇒ c∗0t(h,Xt) = F−1C0|Dt=0,Xt,Wt=0,t
(
h− FC1|Dt=1,Xt,Wt=0,t(c∗1t(h,Xt))Pr(Dt = 1|Xt,Wt = 0, t)
Pr(Dt = 0|Xt,Wt = 0, t)
)
.
Since everything on the right hand side of the equation is known (as I identified c∗1t previously),
the other conditional policies c∗0t(h,Xt) are also identified ∀Xt ∈ Xt, h ∈ [0, 1]. Once the CCCs are
identified, we proceed as usual to identify the CCPs.
4.2.2 Transitions
The transitions f(xt+1|ct, dt, xt) are identified directly from the data by observing the conditional
transitions of the variables between consecutive periods t and t+1. The transition of the instrument
is known by construction if wt+1 = dt. In other cases, it can also be recovered from the data (and
one can test if it is indeed independent from wt).
As standard in the dynamic model literature, I assume agents are rational so that the observed
transitions are the same as the one expected by the agents. This way, the transitions recovered from
the data can be used to build agents expectations at each time t, and help recover the primitives.
4.2.3 Payoff function
Once the CCCs, CCPs and transitions are identified, I can build upon existing literature to identiy
the payoffs (Hotz and Miller, 1993; Blundell et al., 1997; Magnac and Thesmar, 2002; Escanciano
et al., 2015). I need to introduce some additional structure to the dynamic model for non-parametric
identification: I introduce additional structure on the covariates transition and current utility func-
tion.
Budget Constraint: let us introduce additional structure on the transitions via a budget con-
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straint :
at+1 = (1 + rt)at − ct + ytdt, (7)
where at is the individual asset holdings, yt is her income and rt is the interest rate. The asset plays
a different role than the other covariates. Indeed, its transition to at+1 is directly impacted by the
choice ct through the budget constraint (7). Denote more generally all the covariates xt = (x̃t, at)
to emphasize the role of the asset.8
Assumption 12 (Asset exclusion) The asset is excluded from the current period utility, i.e.,
udt(cdt, xt, ηt) = udt(cdt, x̃t, at, ηt) = udt(cdt, x̃t, ηt).
Or equivalently, the exclusion Assumption 12 can be stated as:
∂udt(cdt, x̃t, at, ηt)
∂at
= 0.
Assumption 13 (General Covariates Transitions) For all x̃t ∈ X̃ ,∀dt ∈ D,∀ct ∈ C, ct does
not impact the x̃t and wt transitions, i.e.,
ft(x̃t+1, wt+1|ct, dt, x̃t) = ft(x̃t+1, wt+1|dt, x̃t).
I also need some additional structure on the current period utility:
Assumption 14 (Stationary utility) The current period utility is independent from time
udt(cdt, x̃t, ηt) = ud(cdt, x̃t, ηt) ∀t.
Assumption 15 (Monotonicity of c on the current utility) The current period utility is mono-
tone increasing with respect to c
∂udt(cdt, x̃t, ηt)
∂c
> 0 ∀dt, cdt, x̃t, ηt.
Marginal utilities identification:
8Note that yt and rt are included in x̃t. Even though, in most applications they will also be excluded from the
current period utility. For notational simplicity and generality, I let them into the general x̃t term which enters in
the current utility and represents all the covariates other than asset, i.e., all the covariates whose transitions are not
impacted by ct (Assumption 13).
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Lemma 5 (Escanciano et al. (2015)) Following Escanciano et al. (2015), under Assumptions




are identified up to a scale by the Euler Equation for all d, xt, ηt.
Proof.
Let us define




i.e., the conditional marginal utilities at the optimal CCCs. Notice that these functions depend
on xt = (x̃t, at). In other words, the optimal conditional marginal utilities depend on the asset,
through the optimal CCCs. Then, the Euler equations for all d can be rewritten as:
u′∗d (xt, ηt) = β(1 + rt)Et
[
u′∗dt+1(xt+1, ηt+1)
∣∣∣xt, cdt = c∗dt(ηt, xt), dt = d]. (8)
We have a system of two equations with two unknown functions u′∗0 and u′∗1 . Hence the importance of
Assumption 14, otherwise we would have a different unknown function on each side of the equation.
Now, under Assumption D3 and 15, I have
∂u′∗d (xt, ηt)/∂ηt > 0 ∀d, xt, ηt.
In this case, Escanciano et al. (2015) show that these functions are non-parametrically globally
point identified by the system (8).
Conditional values:
Once the marginal utilities are identified through Lemma 5, I follow Blundell et al. (1997) to identify
the conditional values.
Lemma 6 (Blundell et al. (1997)) Under Assumptions D1-D3 and 4-15, the conditional value
functions at optimal choices vdt(c∗dt(xt, ηt), xt, ηt) are identified up to an unknown constant of inte-
gration K independent from the asset for all d, xt, ηt. i.e.,
vdt(c
∗
dt(ηt, xt), xt, ηt) = Gdt(x̃t, at, ηt) +Kdt(x̃t, ηt),
where G and K are defined in the proof.
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vdt(cdt, x̃t, at, ηt) = (1 + rt)
∂
∂cdt
ud(cdt, x̃t, ηt) |cdt=c∗dt(ηt,x̃t,at). (9)
Denote v∗d is the conditional value taken at the optimal continuous choice, and similarly define u′∗d




v∗dt(x̃t, at, ηt) = (1 + rt) u
′∗
d (x̃t, at, ηt). (10)
Crucially, following Assumption 12, the asset is excluded from the current period utilities and
marginal utilities. The identification strategy relies on this exclusion. Indeed, from this FOC (9)
at the optimal CCCs, I can integrate with respect to the continuous asset and obtain
∀d : ∀at v∗dt(x̃t, at, ηt) =
∫ at
0
(1 + rt) u
′∗
d (x̃t, at, ηt) da,
where the lower bound 0 is taken arbitrarily. Since u′∗d are identified, we can identify the optimal
conditional value functions non-parametrically as:
v∗dt(x̃t, at, ηt) ≡ Gdt(x̃t, at, ηt) +Kdt(x̃t, ηt).
Where the only remaining unknowns are Kdt(x̃t, ηt) which are unknown constant of integration,
independent from at, and which depends on the arbitrary lower bound of integration.
Additive term mdt(xt, wt, ηt):
It remains to identify the additive terms. I identify the differences in total conditional values by
relating them to the CCPs using an Hotz and Miller (1993)’s inversion, as in section 3.4. In other
words,
∆v∗t (x̃t, at, ηt) + ∆mt(xt, wt, ηt) = v
∗
1t(x̃t, at, ηt)− v∗0t(x̃t, at, ηt) +m1t(xt, wt, ηt)−m0(xt, wt, ηt)
= G1t(x̃t, at, ηt)−G0t(x̃t, at, ηt) +K1t(x̃t, ηt)−K0t(x̃t, ηt) +m1t(xt, wt, ηt)−m0(xt, wt, ηt)
are identified through the CCPs Pr(d|ηt, xt, wt, t) for all d, xt, ηt, wt, t. Note that I cannot identify
Kdt separately from mdt. A natural normalization is to impose
Kdt(x̃t, ηt) = 0 ∀d, x̃t, ηt, t
Such that the only remaining additive terms aremdt. Under this normalization, given that v∗dt(x̃t, at, ηt) =
Gdt(x̃t, at, ηt) have been previously identified, it means that ∆mt(xt, wt, ηt) are identified for all
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d, xt, ηt, wt, t. Obviously, since these are identified through the discrete choice probabilities, one can
only non-parametrically identify the differences in md, not their separate values at each d.
About the role of each assumptions:
Assumption 12 excludes the asset from the utility. Having an excluded asset is essential to
recover the conditional values once the marginal current utilities are identified.
Assumption 13 implies that the only covariate whose transition is impacted by the choice ct is
the asset, through the budget constraint (7). This assumption is made to pin down a simpler Euler
equation than with general transitions with several variables impacted by ct.
To identify the marginal utility non-parametrically from the Euler Equation, one needs to im-
pose some structure on the effect of time in the utility function. I impose that the current period
utility is time independent through Assumption 14. Note that, in general, even if the current period
utility is time independent, the conditional value functions are still time-dependent, because of a
finite horizon, or because of time-dependent transitions. Also note that this assumption is only
necessary for non-parametric identification. In parametric models, I can identify time-dependent
utilities.
Assumption 15 is a slightly stronger monotonicity condition than the ones I imposed before. In
most empirical applications it will be satisfied though.
5 Estimation
I build a two-step estimation process in the spirit of Hotz and Miller (1993); Arcidiacono and Miller
(2011) in the discrete choice literature. In the first step, I estimate the conditional continuous choices
(CCCs) and the conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) based on reduced forms directly estimated
from the data. This step is data-driven and is independent from the model specification. In a
second step, I use the estimated optimal policies to estimate the structural parameters. Therefore,
my estimation method is an analogous to that of Hotz and Miller (1993) and Hotz et al. (1994)
but extended to discrete-continuous choices. Its main desirable feature concerns computational
gains. By estimating the optimal choices only once, the computational burden of the estimation is
significantly reduced. Indeed, one does not need to solve for the value function or the likelihood
for each new set of selected parameters. This allows us to estimate models that were previously
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computationally intractable. It does so at minimal efficiency costs (compared to simulated method
of moments, for example). I expose the estimation method in this section, and I compare my
estimator’s performance with several alternatives in terms of speed and efficiency in the next section
6.
5.1 1st stage: conditional choices
Reduced forms:








This initial estimation of the reduced forms is crucial, as all the subsequent estimates are de-
rived from it. The reduced forms probabilities Pr(Dt = d|Xt = x,Wt = w, t) can be estimated
non-parametrically by kernel or by Sieve logistic or probit regressions. Recall that these probabili-
ties are not the CCPs, as the CCPs are also conditional on ηt.
The continuous choice conditional distributions can also be estimated with non-parametric ker-
nel methods (e.g. Hayfield and Racine, 2008). Another alternative is to first estimate the quantile
functions via non-crossing conditional quantile estimation (Muggeo, 2018; Lipsitz et al., 2017, for
example), and then invert them to recover the conditional distributions.
In the dynamic setup, the reduced forms also include the transition probabilities from t to t+ 1:
ft(xt+1, wt+1|ct, dt, xt) is estimated as usual. Let us distinguish again the asset from other covariates:
xt = (x̃t, at). Under Assumption 13, ft(x̃t+1, wt+1|dt, x̃t) can be estimated using auto-regressive pro-
cesses for the general covariates x̃t. In the special case where wt = dt−1, then the transition of the
instrument is given by construction. The asset plays a particular role and its transition is given by
the budget constraint (7): at+1 = (1 + rt)at − ct + ytdt.
Conditional Continuous Choices (CCCs):
I estimate the CCCs based on the identification proof. The idea is that we want to solve for the
monotone functions cdt(h, x), which solves the empirical counterpart of system (2):
h = F̂C0t|Dt=0,xt,wt(c0t(h, xt))
̂Pr(Dt = 0|wt, xt) + F̂C1t|Dt=0,xt,wt(c1t(h, xt)) ̂Pr(Dt = 1|wt, xt) ∀wt, h, xt, t,
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where I replaced the reduced forms by their empirical counterparts. In practice, solving for two
functions c0 and c1 is not convenient. To simplify, I build upon the identification proof and I first
estimate the monotone mapping ĉ0t(c1t, xt) between the two consumptions. Then I will estimate
ĥ(c1). Consider the empirical counterpart to equation (3):
∆̂FC0t|xt(c0t(c1t, xt)) = −∆̂FC1t|xt(c1t) ∀c1t
Thus, for any given xt, I estimate the conditional consumption mapping ĉ0t(c1t, xt) by solving for






∆̂FC0t|xt(c0t(c1t, xt)) + ∆̂FC1t|xt(c1t)
)2
weight(c1t) dc1t.
It gives a weighted minimum distance estimator to solve for the whole function, instead of proceeding
pointwise c1 by c1.9 On a practical note, I resort to constrained optimization to solve for the function:
select a grid of c1, and search for the corresponding c0 by imposing the monotonicity constraint
that if ca1 < cb1, then c0(ca1) < c0(cb1) for every point in the grid. I repeat this estimation procedure
separately for several values of xt.
Once ĉ0t(c1t, xt) is estimated for all xt, I can estimate ĥt(c1, xt) using any equation of system (2)
(with wt = 0 or wt = 1) as:10
ĥt(c1t, xt) = F̂C0t|Dt=0,wt,xt(ĉ0t(c1t, xt))
̂Pr(Dt = 0|wt, xt) + F̂C1t|Dt=0,wt,xt(c1t) ̂Pr(Dt = 1|wt, xt).
Once I have estimated the monotone functions (ĥt(c1t, xt), ĉ0t(c1t, xt)) for all c1t ∈ C1 and for all xt,
I easily recover the CCCs:
{ĉ0t(h, xt), ĉ1t(h, xt)} ∀(h, xt) ∈ [0, 1]×X
9For the weight(c1t), I put uniform weights on the quantile of c1t. More precisely, I do not solve for the optimal
consumption mapping, but for the optimal quantile mapping between the two consumptions. I look for the quantile
of γ0 of c0 which corresponds to a given quantile of c1 denoted γ1. Thus, following the notation in the Appendix B






∆̂F 0|xt(γ0t(γ1t, xt)) + ∆̂F 1|xt(γ1t)
)2
weight(γ1t) dγ1t.
In this case, weight(γ1t) = 1 for all γ1t. And the support of the integral is simply [0, 1] since the quantiles are uniform.
10In practice, the two equations might not yield exactly the same results because of the noise in the estimation
of the reduced forms. Therefore, I will estimate two different h with each equation (with w = 0 and w = 1) and
obtain my final estimate by weighting the two estimates by the number of observations when (Xt = xt,Wt = 0) and
(Xt = xt,Wt = 1).
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by flipping the arguments (because everything is monotone).
Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs):
Once the monotone CCCs are estimated, I estimate ht from observed (ct, dt, xt) in the data, by
inverting the CCCs.
If dt = d : ĥt = ĉ−1dt (c
obs
t , xt).
Then, you can use ĥt as if it was observed (like a generated covariate), and estimate the Conditional
Choice Probabilities
P̂ r(Dt = d|ηt = h,Xt = xt,Wt = wt).
Again, similarly to the reduced forms probabilities, this estimation can be done non-parametrically
with kernel or by Sieve logistic or probit regressions.
Alternative methods:
One could resort to estimation methods proposed in the IV-quantile treatment effect literature and
based on Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008), or that based on Vuong and Xu (2017), described
in Feng et al. (2020). With respect to these methods, the advantage of the method developed here is
that it is entirely based on the constructive identification proof and does not impose any additional
assumptions. The estimation is more flexible, and does not require full rank or other assumptions
on the conditional choice probabilities (as in the practical estimation paper of Feng et al. (2020))
to hold, for example.
Alternatively, the CCCs and CCPs coud be jointly estimated by Sieve, directly from the data,
without estimating reduced forms beforehand. Indeed, for any CCC guess (which has to be mono-
tone in η), one can recover the corresponding η from observing cd in the data. Joint with a CCP
guess, one can derive the likelihood of any data point. Therefore, the CCCs and CCPs can be
estimated directly by Sieve maximum likelihood.
5.2 2nd stage: structural model
I provide an estimation method for parametric models here. I do so for practical reasons since
this avoids the curse of dimensionality and because it fits most applications. Assume the model is
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parametrized by θ ∈ Θ. As I did not address the identification of β (Magnac and Thesmar, 2002),
I do not estimate it either, so it does not enter θ. The parameters θ can be divided into two parts
θ = (θ0, θ1): where θ0 enters the marginal utility and θ1 does not. In the setup, u is parametrized by
θ0, and denoted ud(cdt, x̃t, ηt, θ0). The additive term mdt(xt, wt, ηt, θ1) is parametrized by θ1. More
precisely, θ1 impacts the difference ∆mt(xt, wt, ηt, θ1) of m1t(xt, wt, ηt) −m0t(xt, wt, ηt), since only
the difference is identified by the discrete choices.
I want to estimate θ. To do so, I use the CCCs, the CCPs and the transition estimated in the
first stage. My estimation method is based on the minimization of two different objectives identi-
fying different parameters: one based on the Euler equation and the other based on the conditional
choice probabilities.
Euler objective:
Recall the notation for the marginal utilities at the optimal CCCs:
u′∗d (x̃t, at, ηt, θ0) =
∂
∂cdt
ud(cdt, x̃t, ηt, θ0)|cdt=c∗dt(ηt,x̃t,at).
Thus, we have the Euler equation:
u′∗d (x̃t, at, ηt, θ0) = β(1 + rt)Et
[
u′∗dt+1(x̃t+1, at+1, ηt+1, θ0)
∣∣∣xt, cdt = c∗dt(ηt, xt), dt = d]
def⇐⇒ q1(t, dt, ηt, xt, θ0) = q2(t, dt, ηt, xt, θ0),
where xt = (x̃t, at).
The CCCs and the CCPs have been estimated in the first stage for all dt, xt, ηt, t. I also estimated






(q1(t, dt, ηt, xt, θ0)− q2(t, dt, ηt, xt, θ0))2 .
In other words, θ̂0 minimizes the differences between the two sides of the Euler equation for every
observation i in the sample.11 Now, q1 is directly given as a function of θ0 and of the observed
11In practice, it is better to rewrite the objective such that it is scale invariant and comparable for all the values of
θ0. For example, if ceteris paribus a specific parameter value in θ0 scales down everything in q1 and q2, the errors will
be small at this parameter value, regardless of whether or not this parameter is far from the truth. To avoid that,
one need that, for any set of parameters θ0, the Euler Equation errors are on a similar scale. Log-linearization can
be used to achieve this, for example. In the next section the parametric model is such that I can isolate consumption
on the left-hand side of the Euler Equation. In this case, the left-hand side of the equation is based on consumption
data and is independent of the parameters. Thus I can compare the results between parameters on the same basis.
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characteristics and choices. q2, on the other hand, contains an expectation and can be computed in
several ways.
The first way is to use individuals present for two consecutive periods and to estimate the
expectation of future utility using all individuals with the same current states xt, cdt, dt. Since c
is continuous and x contains continuous covariates, this can be done parametrically or via non-
parametric kernel mean regression. This method is the simplest, but it requires many observations.
It is close to the idea of Euler-GMM estimation, as pioneered by Hansen and Singleton (1982). The
problem is that when the marginal utilities are highly nonlinear, the expectation is poorly estimated
and this type of GMM estimation does not work well and needs to be refined Alan et al. (2009).
Hence, I prefer to use an alternative approach based on forward simulations, in the spirit of
(Hotz et al., 1994). The idea is to use the CCCs, the CCPs and the transition to estimate the
expectation term via one-period-ahead simulation. This method is slightly longer but less affected
by the nonlinearity problem. It requires to estimate the transitions consistently.
Probability objective:
Now, the Euler equation does not provide any information about the parameters impacting the
differences of the additive term, θ1. To estimate these parameters, I use the relation between the
choice probabilities and the conditional value function (Hotz and Miller, 1993). In particular, if ε
is extreme value type I, we have:
Pr(D = 0|ηt,xt, wt, θ) =
1
1 + exp (v∗1t(xt, ηt, θ) +m1t(xt, wt, ηt, θ1)− (v∗0t(xt, ηt, θ) +m0(xt, wt, ηt, θ1)))
(11)
Knowing θ, one can estimate the conditional optimal values v∗dt(xt, ηt, θ) by forward simulation of
the life-cycle, for example (Hotz et al., 1994). Note that the value functions are parametrized
by θ and not only θ1. Thus, a way to estimate the parameters is to minimize the differences












There are two consistent ways to estimate θ. The faster one is to perform the estimation in two
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separate steps: (i) estimate θ0 from the Euler equation and (ii) estimate the remaining θ1 from the
probability objective (taking θ̂0 as given). This yields a consistent estimation of θ.
However, the probability objective also depends on (part of) θ0 which is identified by the Euler
equation. An efficient way to account for this information is to perform the estimation in one step




where the optimal weights are to be determined. At the optimal weights, the one step method is
consistent and more efficient than the two-step estimation.
6 Estimator Performance
I test my estimator’s performance with Monte Carlo simulations of the estimation of a parametric
toy model of simultaneous labor and consumption choices. This model is a simplified version of the
application performed in the next section. I provide additional robustness checks in Appendix C.
6.1 Toy model
The agent chooses to work (dt) and consume/save (ct) from t = 1 to t = T . Then she retires for
one period in t = T + 1. She dies in t = T + 2.
Working life:
In each period the agent obtains utility:
udt(ct, xt, ηt) +mdt(xt, wt, ηt) + εdt =
{
c1−σt /(1− σ) η̃0t (ηt, γ0, s0) + ε0t if dt = 0
c1−σt /(1− σ) η̃1t (ηt, γ1, s1) + α + ω(1− wt) + ε1t if dt = 1
subject to the budget constraint:
at+1 = (1 + r)at + dtyt − ct + (1− dt)bt.
t is the age of the agent. ct is the individual consumption. dt is the labor choice, equal to 1 if she
works. wt is the instrument, equal to the past labor choice dt−1. at is the asset holdings. bt rep-
resents benefits earned by unemployed people. yt represents the earnings. yt take only two values,
yL and yH , for low and high income. In this way, the asset is the only continuous covariate, and I
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can reduce the state space with only two values in the support of y. I observe the income for every
individual, even when she does not work. The interest rate r is fixed and equal to 0.05. εt = (ε0t, ε1t)
are additive idiosyncratic shocks impacting preferences for work. They are extreme-value type I.
η̃d are nonseparable taste shocks to utility. η̃d(η, γd, sd) is the ηth quantile of a lognormal(γd, sd)
distribution. In other words, η̃d ∼ LN (γd, sd), so that η̃d are labor-dependent monotone trans-
formations of the uniform η. Having η as quantiles of some specific distribution is a convenient
way of modelling unobserved taste shocks in this type of setup. Thus, (γ0, γ1, s0, s1) capture the
different effects of unobserved taste shocks on the utility depending on working choice. I normalize
γ0 = 0, s0 = 0.25 to interpret the parameters of working individuals with respect to this reference.
The other parameters are more conventional: σ is the risk aversion or intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, α is the utility cost of work, and ω is the cost of searching for a job when one
was previously unemployed (wt = 0). Thus, θ = (
≡θ0︷ ︸︸ ︷
σ, γ0, γ1, s1,
≡θ1︷︸︸︷
α, ω), where θ1 only impacts the
probability of working and not the consumption choices, and θ0 impacts both.
Transitions:
The asset transition is given by the budget constraint.
In the income transitions, I model gains from working experience: Pr(yt+1 = yH |dt = 1, yt) >
Pr(yt+1 = yH |dt = 0, yt) ∀yt. Income is also persistent, so if one had a high income in t, one is more
likely to obtain a high income in t+ 1: Pr(yt+1 = yH |dt, yt = yH) > Pr(yt+1 = yH |dt, yt = yL) ∀dt.
It yields the following transition matrix:





where π1L > π0L, π1H > π0H , π1H > π1L, and π0H > π0L.
These four parameters are estimated directly from the data by estimating Pr(yt = yH |yt−1, dt−1)
with a bin operator, i.e., by computing the number of observations with y = yH over the total of
observations with each specific yt−1, dt−1 combination.
The shocks are iid and uncorrelated over time ηt+1 ⊥ ηt and εt+1 ⊥ εt.
The agent discounts the future with discount factor β. I set it to 0.98 and do not estimate it.
Retirement:
At period T + 1 the woman retires. She only consumes and can no longer work. She obtains
the same period utility as when she was unemployed, without the additive ε shock. She obtains
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a pension(yT ), which is a proportion set to 50% of her last income yT . She lives for only one
period in retirement and knows that she will die at t = T + 2.12 There is no bequest motive. As a
consequence, she will consume everything, i.e., aT+2 = 0. Thus, the last period consumption has a
closed-form solution:
c∗T+1 = (1 + r)aT+1 + pension(yT ).
6.2 Comparison
I run Monte Carlo simulations of this toy model and estimate the parameters θ = (σ, γ0, γ1, s1, α, ω)
using my method. I compare my results with indirect inference Simulated Method of Moments
(SMM) where the model is solved using Endogenous Grid Method (Iskhakov et al., 2017).
Results: (Table 1)
Table 1 shows the estimation results for a model with T = 2 periods.13
In terms of speed, my two-step method (DCC for Discrete-Continuous Choices) yields sizeable
computational gains, even with respect to the state-of-the-art indirect inference method with en-
dogenous grid (Carroll, 2006; Iskhakov et al., 2017). The idea is simple: I have a fixed computational
cost of estimating the CCCs and CCPs in the first stage. However, thereafter, when solving for the
optimal θ, I do not need to solve the model again, as I already have the optimal choices. I only need
to perform some quick computations of the marginal utilities. Concerning the forward simulation,
it is also a fixed cost, as the simulated path depends on first-stage CCCs, CCPs and transitions but
not on θ. Thus, I only simulate forward once, and I retain the same path (as it is recommended to
have the same basis for every set of parameters and to avoid adding some simulation noise to the
estimation) for the computation of the expectations and conditional value functions for each tested
set of parameters. The other methods, on the other hand, do not have my first-stage fixed cost,
but they require considerably more computations in the second stage. If the model is very simple
and the second stage is estimated quickly, these methods can perform quicker than mine in theory.
However, as is well known, life-cycle models require a long time to solve, and the computational
burden increases almost exponentially with the complexity of the model (more covariates, more
12This is a simplification; one could easily allow for a known length of retirement and solve the dynamic consumption
problem of the retiree accordingly (as I do in the application). However, this does not deliver any particular insights
in terms of estimator comparison, so I have agents live for only one period of retirement for simplicity.
13Coded in R, without parallelization here. Time results obtained from an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9750H CPU.
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σ 1.60 1.6253 1.5924
(0.0410) (0.0156)
γ1 0.00 0.0070 -0.0052
(0.0238) (0.0055)
s1 0.40 0.4078 0.4001
(0.0228) (0.0071)
α -0.50 -0.4727 -0.5023
(0.0498) (0.0348)
ω -1.00 -0.9982 -0.9972
(0.0581) (0.0523)
Average Time taken:
1st stage: CCPs and CCCs 118s 9s
2nd stage: Structural parameters 170s 14328s
Overall 288s 14337s
Other initializations: Number of Monte-Carlo = 1, 000
Pr(w1 = 1) = 0.70. y1 = yH with probability 0.50. a1 ∼ U(0, 30). r = 0.05.
parameters, more periods). It can take several minutes to solve for one tested set of parameters,
and finding the optimal parameters may require hundreds or even thousands of tests. Even here,
in this very simple example with two periods, solving the model and estimating the moments for
one set of parameters takes about 25 seconds with EGM. While with my method, computing the
objective for one set of parameter takes less than a second. The more complex the model, the more
this gap widens, as solving the model becomes even longer relatively speaking, while the fixed cost of
computing the first stage policy only takes slighly longer. As a consequence, my two-stage method
yields significant computational gains by reducing the burden of the second stage. Interestingly,
the more complex the model is, the more computation gains from my estimation method relative
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to others. Obviously, having more complex models increases my computation time, but not in the
same exponential manner as for the alternative methods.
In terms of statistical performances, my two-step method (DCC) estimates the parameters con-
sistently and with small standard errors. As also shown in the simpler case of Appendix C where
T = 1, Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) is consistent and more efficient for most param-
eters (if one uses a lot of moments). Both methods build upon the same initial estimation of
the reduced forms conditional consumption distribution FCd|Dt,Xt,Wt,t(c) and probability of working
Pr(Dt = 1|Xt,Wt, t). The moments are selected in these two objects.14 And my first stage estima-
tion of the CCCs is also built on these objects. Therefore, it is not surprising that both methods
yield close results. I lose some efficiency due to the two-step nature of my method, similar to the
efficiency loss of CCPs estimators. In theory, MLE is more efficient than both (see the T = 1
case in Appendix C), but it quickly becomes intractable to compute empirical likelihood with more
periods.
Another advantage of my method is that if the model is misspecified, I still recover correct op-
timal choice estimates because the first stage is independent of the model assumptions (except for
the choice of covariates to include). This is not the case for the alternative methods. Also, as I do
not solve numerically for the optimal choices, I do not need to smooth potential kinks introduced
by joint discrete-continuous choices, contrary to indirect inference with endogenous grid method
(Iskhakov et al., 2017).
Overall, I have a method that is statistically consistent, with small standard errors, and con-
siderably faster, by several orders of magnitude, than alternative state-of-the-art indirect inference
with endogenous grid method. SMM built upon moments drawn from the reduced forms is also
consistent and more efficient but the computational burden is too heavy for complex life-cycle mod-
els.
7 Application: women’s labor and consumption
I illustrate the method developed in this paper with a parametric dynamic model of simultane-
ous employment and consumption choices for women over their life cycle. I choose a parametric
14If we do not pick moments in the reduced forms, i.e., moments conditioned by w, then the model is not identified
and the SMM estimation will not be consistent.
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application for practical reasons: to avoid the curse of dimensionality and to be able to compare
my parameter estimates with the literature. This model especially matters for understanding how
different benefit schedules affect the careers of women, particularly mothers, who are known to be
the most responsive to incentives (Blundell and Macurdy, 1999; Blundell et al., 2016). It allows us
to understand the mechanism underlying individual choices and thus to carry out counterfactual
policy analysis in the long run.
My method is of particular interest for two main reasons here. First, life-cycle models such as
that presented here are extremely computationally intensive to estimate, to the extent that one
often needs to restrict the complexity of the model for the estimation to be tractable. By first
estimating the optimal choices (CCCs and CCPs) and only then the structural parameters in a sec-
ond step, I do not need to solve the model, and I am able to drastically reduce the computational
cost, in the spirit of Hotz and Miller (1993), Hotz et al. (1994) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011).
Faster computation means that one can include more features in existing models, for example, more
heterogeneity, observed or unobserved, and still be able to estimate them in a reasonable time. The
complete estimation of this complex model only takes me a few hours here, while it could take weeks
or months with alternative methods.
In addition to the speed increase, I also include more unobserved heterogeneity in the model with
the η term. Thus, by construction, I estimate the distribution of consumption choices and working
probabilities at any given set of observed covariates, and not only the average choices. This yields
new insights in this literature.
7.1 Model
Overview:
The parametric model enters the general dynamic framework described in section 4.1. It is a more
realistic version of the toy model described previously, with the same key features. I model the
annual consumption and labor supply choices of women from t = 26 to t = 60 years of age. Each
period, women determine their household consumption ct, and whether they work dt.15 At the age
60, they retire and live for 15 more years on their accumulated savings and their pension, which
depends on their last income. Throughout their life, women may bear children. Fertility occurs
15I focus on the extensive margin, not on the number of hours worked. Individuals are assumed to either work full
time or be unemployed. This might be restrictive, particularly for single mothers, who are known to resort more to
part-time jobs.
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randomly following the trend observed in the data, and is not explicitly modelled as a choice. Cou-
ples do not divorce, and new couples are not formed in the model. This is for simplicity to avoid
dividing the assets or modelling individual husbands’ assets. Women’s productivities (and thus
wages) evolve over their careers. Labor supply choice plays a key role in this evolution, as work-
ing experience increases expected future wages, while productivity can depreciate for unemployed
women. Similarly, asset holdings evolves over the life cycle following a budget constraint that de-
pends on previous asset holdings, consumption, women’s productivities and labor choices (they are
paid only if they work), their potential husband’s annual income and the tax schedule to which they
are subject. The benefit/tax schedule is simplified and estimated based on observed data. It differs
depending on the individual’s family situation, wealth and labor choice. Finally, women are subject
to unobserved preference shocks η and ε. η is their unobserved taste shock for consumption, and ε
represents their unobserved preference for work. With η, I can estimate heterogeneous consumption
choices for individuals who are identical as measured by their covariates.
I now describe the model in greater detail.
Working life:
t
t t+ t++ t+ 1
Starts
with states
zt = (xt, wt)





From age t0 = 26 to age T = 60, a woman is in her working life. She makes her decision (dt,
ct) to maximize her expected lifetime utility given her characteristics. These characteristics include
her age (t), her income (yt), her assets (at) and some demographics x̃t: her number of children
(nchildt), whether she is in a couple (couplet), and if so, her partner’s annual income (ypt ) and labor
force participation dpt . All these covariates are included in xt = (at, yt, x̃t).16 Her decision to work is
also influenced by whether she worked before wt = dt−1, for which we observe w0 = d−1. wt matters
because of the utility cost of switching from being unemployed to employed. She also makes her
decision based on two idiosyncratic shocks ηt and εt, unobserved by the econometrician. To satisfy
16A small detail: yt is now excluded from x̃t, at minimal risk of confusion. It is because yt does not enter the
current period utility directly.
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the distributional Assumptions 4-7, we have ηt ∼ U(0, 1) iid over time, and εt is i.i.d. extreme-value
type I.
Each period, the agent obtains utility:
u(ct, dt, wt, xt, ηt, εt) =
{
(ct/nt)
1−σ /(1− σ) η̃0t (ηt, couplet, nchildt) + ε0t if dt = 0
(ct/nt)
1−σ /(1− σ) η̃1t (ηt, couplet, nchildt) + α + ω(1− wt) + ε1t if dt = 1
≡

u0(ct, x̃t, ηt) + ε0t
u1(ct, x̃t, ηt) + α + ω(1− wt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=m1(wt)
+ ε1t .
where ct is the total household consumption over the period, nt is an equivalence scale, which de-
pends on the number of consumption units in the household, i.e., nt(couplet, nchildt), with nt(0, 0) =
1, nt(1, 0) = 1.6, nt(0, 1 or more) = 1.4, nt(1, 1 or more) = 2 (Blundell et al., 2016). Thus, ct/nt rep-
resents individual consumption. σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution/risk aversion param-
eter. The effect of the unobserved shock ηt varies depending on the work choice (dt) and family situ-
ation (couplet, nchildt). η̃dt are transformations of ηt, where η̃dt ∼ LN (γd+γcdcouplet+γndnchildt, sd).
η̃dt are the ηth quantiles of these distributions. This is a convenient way to include covariates in this
setup. Since ηt ∼ U(0, 1), the transformation to η̃dt allows for a wide range of effects of ηt. Note that
with this functional form, the monotonicity Assumption D3 is satisfied. The parameters (γd, sd)
represent the baseline effect of unobserved heterogeneity depending on working behaviour, for single
women without children. The parameters (γnd , γcd) determine the effect of the family situation. I
set γ0 to 0 and s0 to 0.5 so that the other coefficients are interpreted with respect to this baseline.
The agents incur a utility cost α from working. wt is the instrument that corresponds to the past
labor choice, wt = dt−1. The agents incur a an utility cost ω from searching for a job (if they were
previously unemployed). Thus, mdt(wt, xt, ηt) = αdt + ω(1 − wt)dt, and it is independent of xt, ηt
and t in this application (which is stronger than necessary for the identification). By the additivity
of the instrument wt, Assumption D2 is satisfied. Similarly, additive separability of εt (Assumption
D1) is satisfied. Note that I have time independent current utility. However in the parametric
framework I can identify time-varying utility (Assumption 14 is only necessary for non-parametric
identification). Thus one could include and estimate time fixed effects for example.
Transition:
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The woman makes her choice of dt, ct subject to the household budget constraint :




t + T (dt, xt).
This budget constraint describes the asset transition over time. r is the real interest rate. If the
woman works dt = 1, she obtains a wage yt. If she has a husband (couplet = 1) who works (dpt = 1),
the household also obtains his total income (= 0 if he does not work). T (dt, xt) is the benefit-tax
schedule. It is a function of the covariates and labor choice. I estimate it directly from the data.
Earnings yt and husband’s earnings ypt evolve over time according to an auto-regressive process:










where ut, vt may be correlated. Working (dt = 1) allows individuals to change their expected earn-
ings and potentially increase them. Unemployment will decrease productivity if ρy < 1, i.e., human
capital depreciates. Therefore, working is important not only for current consumption and savings
but also for its impact on human capital accumulation. All these coefficients vary with the education
level (≤secondary, high school or university) of the woman, educt. I do not include the education
of the partner to avoid having too many variables in the model, since I focus on the woman. The
earning process is estimated directly from the data on observed transitions.
Auto-regressive processes are also estimated for fertility (having a new-born child) and for the
husband’s work decisions. These depend on past xt only. dt and ct do not enter the transitions
here.
Finally, by construction, the next value of the instrument wt+1 = dt and the other covariates
than dt are irrelevant for its transition. Since conditional on current (dt, ct, xt), wt does not enter
the transition of the other variables, the conditional independence Assumption 10 is satisfied.
Retirement:
At age T , the woman retires, and can no longer decide to work. She obtains the same utility as
when she did not work, with dt = 0, without the additive ε shock.17 She lives for another 15
years on her accumulated assets and receives a pension that is a proportion of her last income
17Instead, I can normalize the utility of retired women with parameters γr and sr. In which case, I could estimate
the γ0 and s0 of unemployed women with respect to the retirees baseline. However, my estimation would then be
driven by the data comparison of the Euler equation at the retirement age, which represents only a small subset of
my panel. Therefore, I prefer to set the utility of retirees equal to the utility of unemployed individuals.
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yT . I include no bequest motive in the model. One can easily solve the consumption problem of
retirees, which depend on their last income and assets, to obtain the expected retirement utility :
R(xT ) = R(aT , yT , y
p
T , coupleT , nchildT ).
Life-cycle problem:
The working life decision problem is the one that interests us. Given the development above, at










where the future is discounted at a rate β.
For notational simplicity, denote VT+1(zT+1) = R(xT ), a special form of the value function for
the retirement period. We have already verified that the identification assumptions hold. Therefore,
following computations performed in section 4.1, we return to the general setup, where the woman
selects dt and ct at each age t to solve:
max
dt,cdt
vd(cdt, xt, ηt) +md(x̃t, wt, ηt) + εdt, (12)
where the conditional value function is given by:
vdt(cdt, xt, ηt) ≡ ud(cdt, x̃t, ηt) + βEzt+1 [Vt+1(zt+1)|xt,cdt,dt ].
The agent internalizes the effect of her choice on her future, discounting it at a rate β. Note that
even here where the current utility has a known parametric form, the conditional value’s form is
generally more complex, with no closed form solution. It depends on complex transitions and expec-
tations about the future. Therefore, the advantage of my method, i.e., that I am able to estimate
both the optimal policies (CCCs and CCPs) and the parameters of interest without numerically
solving for the conditional value, also applies to parametric dynamic models, hence the sizeable
computational gains.
7.2 Data
To estimate the model, I use EU-SILC French survey data. It is a survey conducted every year and
follows households from 2004 to 2015. The data contain information about the labor market status
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(income, job tenure), asset holdings (financial and housing), tax paid and benefits received, and
personal characteristics of the individuals (family situation, education, etc.). Data are available for
all the individuals within the household, which is why I also have detailed information about the
partner.
Consumption is not directly available in the data, I reconstruct it for households present over
two consecutive years based assets evolution and savings.
I set that a woman works (d = 1) if she worked more than 6 months during the year.
Income is only reported for employed women and husbands. I estimate y and yp based on the
income information of workers using the standard Heckman correction (Heckman, 1979) before-
hand. For simplicity, I assume that income is observed for everyone using these estimations when
I estimate the model.18 I estimate this on the subsample of full-time working individuals so that I
obtain a productivity yt representing full-time equivalent productivity. In this estimation, I include
covariates other than those used in the model, including education, experience, some parent back-
ground information, and zone and year fixed effects.
After cleaning the data for outliers and missing values, I end up with an unbalanced panel of
7, 391 women between 26 and 60 years of age, yielding a total of 21, 945 observations over 11 years.
I fix the real interest rate r at the average of the period (= 0.05), as given by the IMF French data.
Descriptive statistics:
Table 2 describes the sample of data I use; 76% of women work, with a strong auto-correlation in
employment: if a woman worked before (wt = dt−1 = 1), Pr(Dt = 1|wt = 1) is very high = 0.96,
while if she did not, Pr(Dt = 1|wt = 0) = 0.14 is low. This suggests that w should be a relevant
instrument for d. On average, households consume 36k5 euros per year. Observed consumption
conditional on working (c1t|dt = 1) is higher than consumption conditional on being unemployed
(c0t|dt = 0). However, we do not yet know how much of this is due to the selection: it is pos-
sible that women with high ηt select more into employment, boosting the average consumption
conditional on working. Regarding the covariates, there is considerable variance in asset holdings.
Most women (75%) are in couples, with a median number of 2 children. Their partner is generally
working (93%), far more frequently than the women. The partner’s income is also larger than
18Obviously, given that the probability of working is a key part of the model, ideally one would prefer to build
our own Heckman correction within the model here, with some kind of nested iteration with the CCP, CCC and
productivity estimation, in the spirit of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) for example. Another good way to deal with
it would be to include unobserved types, as in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), and have wage depend on these types.
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Table 2: EU-SILC unbalanced panel, 2004− 2015, 7391 women
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Choices:
Annual household c (k euros) 21,945 36.58 20.99 3.88 32.54 211.54
c|d = 0 5,330 30.04 19.32 4.02 25.58 204.48
c|d = 1 16,615 38.67 21.07 3.88 34.78 211.54
d 21,945 0.76 0.43 0 1 1
w 21,945 0.76 0.43 0 1 1
d|w = 0 5,354 0.14 0.35 0 0 1
d|w = 1 16,591 0.96 0.20 0 1 1
Covariates:
Age 21,945 42.37 9.39 26 42 60
Annual Income y (Heckman) 21,945 19.74 5.29 8.10 19.07 43.32
Asset 21,945 108.29 118.55 −32 69.0 528
Nb of children 21,945 1.71 1.09 0 2 4
Couple 21,945 0.75 0.43 0 1 1
Working partner|Couple 16,442 0.93 0.25 0 1 1
Partner’s income yp |Couple 16,442 26.41 13.21 4.02 23.20 147.54
Completed Education 21,945
≤ Secondary 5,240 0.24
High School 9,999 0.46
University 6,706 0.30
Other:
Receives Benefits 21,945 0.66 0.47 0 1 1
Benefits|Benefits > 0 14,478 5.16 4.46 0.002 3.60 23.07
c, y, yp, asset and benefits expressed in real terms (base 2010) and in thousands of euros.
the woman’s annual income. Finally, approximately 66% of the households received some kind of
benefit. These benefits include not only unemployment benefits, but also family benefits, for ex-
ample. This is why there are more people receiving benefits than the number of unemployed people.
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7.3 1st stage: Optimal Choices Estimation
7.3.1 Estimation
I follow the procedure described in section 5. First, I estimate the reduced-form probabilities and
conditional distributions. The probabilities are estimated with a sieve logistic regression. The
conditional distributions are estimated via non-parametric kernel methods (R package np, Hayfield
and Racine, 2008).
Then, I estimate the CCCs cdt(ht, xt) for all ht, xt accordingly. Once I have the CCCs, I estimate
ĥt from the observed (ct, dt, xt). I then recover the CCPs P̂ r(Dt = d|ηt = h,Xt = x,Wt = wt) using
a sieve logistic regression.
I also estimate the transitions toXt+1|Xt, Dt, Ct according to the description provided previously.
7.3.2 Results
Figure 1: CCCs and CCPs estimates
ĉ∗dt(h, x)













P̂ r(D = 1|h, x, w, t)






















Average evolution of a baseline woman with median characteristics: 26y.o. woman with income of 17k5
euros, no assets, in a couple, no children, with a partner earning 22k euros.
Optimal Choices:
Figure 1 shows the optimal choice estimates for the median 26 year-old woman. Potential con-
sumption when working is always greater than alternative consumption when unemployed, with an
average difference of approximately 3, 930 euros of consumption per year. By construction, these
functions are monotone with respect to the taste shock h.
The conditional choice probabilities are more complicated. First, note that the probability of
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Figure 2: Life-cycle simulations

































































Average evolution of a baseline woman: 26y.o. working (w = 0) woman with income of 17k5 euros, no
assets, in a couple, no children, with a partner earning 22k euros.
And an alternative woman with the same characteristics but 2 children.
working is always greater and close to 1 for individuals who were employed previously. If the me-
dian woman was previously unemployed, however, her probability of working today is less than
50%. The relation between the employment decision and the taste shock is complex. By working,
the woman will obtain an income that she will be able to consume. However, at the same time,
she will have less leisure time. There is a trade-off between a substitution and wealth effect. If she
was previously employed (wt = 1), the higher her taste shock (ηt) was, the less likely the median
woman was to work. The substitution effect dominates. Note that even is she is less likely to work,
in any case, the higher ηt is, the more she consumes. If she was previously unemployed, the case is
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more complicated. Up to approximately the median taste shock, the wealth effect dominates, and
she will choose to work more to consume more. After this threshold, it decreases, and the more she
wants to consume, the less she will work.
Life-cycle simulation:
Figure 2 shows the average results over 1, 000 life-cycle simulation for the median 26 year-old woman
and for an alternative woman with the same characteristics but two children. First, consumption,
income and asset all increase throughout the life cycle. Her partner’s income also increases in a
similar fashion. Once they enter the labor force, women are increasingly likely to work until retire-
ment. By having two children, the alternative woman is less likely to work initially, and this persists
throughout her life cycle. As a consequence, she on average has an income disadvantage, while her
husband seems to suffer no particular penalty. However, with two children she will initially obtain
more benefits and be able to accumulate slightly more assets. The households with two children
consume only slightly more, which suggests that they obtain considerably lower utility from their
individual consumption.
7.4 2nd stage: Structural model Estimation
7.4.1 Estimation



















Following section 4.2.3, denote the marginal utilities at optimal CCCs as:




Thus I have the Euler equation for all d:
u′∗d (x̃t, at, ηt, θ0) = β(1 + rt)Et
[
u′∗dt+1(x̃t+1, at+1, ηt+1, θ0)
∣∣∣xt, cdt, dt].
Here, the functional form of ∂ud(cd, x̃, η)/∂cd is known and depends on the parameter θ0. Thus, θ0
are estimated in a first step by minimizing the differences between the two sides of the equation. For
the left-hand side of the equation, I use every observation in the data, including the estimated η̂ as
if it was observed and the corresponding observed cdt. For the right-hand side, one can either take
the empirical expectation about the future, or simulate it using the estimated CCCs, the CCPs and
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the transitions. Given the small number of observations I have, I prefer to use the former solution
in this application.
The other parameters α and ω (in γ1) additively enter the utility, so they are not in the Euler
equation. They are identified via the CCPs. To recover α and ω, I choose to simulate complete
life cycles for each set of parameters θ using the reduced forms. In this way, I obtain estimates
of the conditional value functions vd(), and using extreme-value type-1 form of ε, I can recover
the theoretical Pr(Dt = 1|ηt, Xt,Wt) and compare them to the CCPs. The optimal parameters
θ minimize these differences. I run the two-stage estimates, so I estimate θ̂1 by minimizing the
difference in probabilities with respect to θ1 with θ0 fixed to the θ̂0 estimated in the first stage.
7.4.2 Results
Table 3: Structural parameter estimates
Parameter estimates
Parameter Estimate
Discount factor β 0.98
(fixed)
Constant Relative Risk Aversion σ 1.63
Effect of η by family...
... when unemployed:






... when employed: γ1 -1.04




Utility cost of working α −0.04
Utility cost of search ω −2.14
Structural Parameters: (Table 3)
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I find a coefficient for risk aversion (and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) similar to the
literature: 1.63 versus 1.56 in Blundell et al. (1994), or 1.53 in Alan et al. (2009). It suggests my
method yields consistent estimations, with more complex model and faster computation.
As expected, the utility cost of searching for a job when previously unemployed is high. In
comparison, the utility cost of working is almost null. For the effect of the taste for consumption,
note first that the smaller the coefficient is, the higher the utility since 1 − σ < 0. Thus, note
that, for a given consumption level, single working women without children have higher utility (on
average) than if they were unemployed (γ1 = −1.04 < γ0 = 0). When they are in couples without
children, their utility is similar (−1.04 − 0.65 versus −1.80). Additional children yield more disu-
tility for employed women (−0.10 > −0.31). The variances are similar (s1 = 0.54 close to the fixed
s0 = 0.50). e
One could use this estimated model to perform counterfactual analysis and study the effect of
different labor market reforms on women’s consumption and career choice, such as, the effect of
increasing the age of retirement or changing the benefits given to single mothers.
8 Conclusion
This paper develops a general class of discrete-continuous choice models and provides a list of
conditions to achieve non-parametric identification. The identification proof is original as it solves
for a unique monotone function instead of proceeding pointwise, which allows identification under
weaker relevance conditions than in the existing literature.
Given the identification, I provide a new estimation procedure yielding sizeable computational
gains with respect to the existing alternatives for the estimation of dynamic models. The gains are
so large that they should facilitate the use of complex dynamic discrete-continuous models in the
future and offer greater latitude to researchers to test for several model specifications. This will
allow us to find new results in several fields where my methodology can be applied: labor, housing,
education, industrial organization, etc.
On a final note, part of the method described here applies more broadly to discrete-continuous
dynamic processes, choices or not. This yields additional interesting dynamic applications.
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A Proof: Lemma 3
I prove Lemma 3.
Proof. First, let us relate Pr(d|η = h,W = 1)−Pr(d|η = h,W = 0) to the distributions/quantiles.
Recall that using Bayes and η ⊥ w, we have ∀w:
h = Pr(η ≤ h)
= Pr(η ≤ h|w)
= Pr(η ≤ h | D = 0, w)Pr(D = 0|w) + Pr(η ≤ h | D = 1, w)Pr(D = 1|w)
= Fη|D=0,w(h)p0|w + Fη|D=1,w(h)p1|w. (13)
Then, combining (13) at w = 1 and w = 0, we obtain ∀h:




def⇐⇒ ∆Fη0(h) = ∆Fη1(h). (14)
Moreover, notice that we can rewrite Fηd|w(h):
Fη|d,w(h) = Pr(η ≤ h|d, w)
= Pr(η ≤ h, d|w)/Pr(d|w)
= Pr(d|η ≤ h,w)Pr(η ≤ h|w)/Pr(d|w). (15)
Let us focus on the choice D = 0 (by symmetry it will be the same for D = 1) and rewrite (14) by
plugging (15) into it:
∆Fη0(h) =
[
Pr(D = 0|η ≤ h,W = 1)Pr(η ≤ h|W = 1)/(((((
((((
(





Pr(D = 0|W = 1)
−
[
Pr(D = 0|η ≤ h,W = 0)Pr(η ≤ h|W = 0)/(((((
((((
(





Pr(D = 0|W = 0).
Moreover, since W ⊥ η: Pr(η ≤ h|W = 1) = Pr(η ≤ h|W = 0) = Pr(η ≤ h) = h, we have:
∆Fη0(h) =
[
Pr(D = 0|η ≤ h,W = 1)− Pr(D = 0|η ≤ h,W = 0)
]
h. (16)
Now, note that if η ∼ U(0, 1):
Pr(D = 0|η ≤ h0, w) =
∫ h0
0
Pr(D = 0|η = h,w)/F (h0)dh =
∫ h0
0
Pr(D = 0|η = h,w)/h0dh. (17)
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Pr(D = 0|η = h,W = 1)/h0dh−
∫ h0
0











Pr(D = 0|η = h,W = 1)− Pr(D = 0|η = h,W = 0) = d∆Fη0(h)
dh
.
Moreover, if cd(h) is a strictly monotone solution to our problem, we have Fη|d,w(h) = FCd|d,w(cd(h)),
and thus ∀h:
∆Fη0(h) = Fη|D=0,1(h)p0|1 − Fη|D=0,0(h)p0|0
















So, under assumption 9b, there is a finite set of K points h ∈ [0, 1] such that Pr(D = 0|η =
h,W = 1)− Pr(D = 0|η = h,W = 0) = 0. Then there is a finite set of K points c0(hk) such that
d∆FC0(c0(h))/dh = 0. And since c′0(h) > 0 because of the monotonicity of the quantiles, it implies
that there is a finite set of K points such that d∆FC0(c0)/dc0 = 0.
We can follow exactly the same reasoning for D = 1. We obtain that, if there is a finite set
of K points h ∈ [0, 1] such that Pr(D = 1|η = h,W = 1) − Pr(D = 1|η = h,W = 0) = 0, then
there is a finite set of K points c1(hk) such that d∆FC1(c1(h))/dh = 0. Since c′1(h) > 0 because
of the monotonicity of the quantiles, it implies that there is a finite set of K points such that
d∆FC1(c1)/dc1 = 0.
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B Proof of Identification Theorem 1
I develop the complete proof of Theorem 1 about the identification of the continuous choice policies.
Proof. For a given increasing solution cd(h), let us first introduce the notation:
pd|w ≡ Pr(D = d|W = w)
γd(h) ≡ FCd|D=d,W=0(cd(h))







Recall from Lemma 2 that FCd|d,w(c): Cd → [0, 1] is C1 and strictly increasing function of c. Now,
under assumption 3, a solution cd(h) is also a strictly increasing and C1 function of h. Thus γd(h)
are C1 and strictly increasing functions of h, from γd(0) = 0 to γd(1) = 1. The mappings Ψd1(γd)
give us the mapping from the quantiles of cd with instrument value W = 0 to their counterpart
with instrument value W = 1. Similarly, given Lemma 2, we have that Ψd1 are also C1 and strictly
increasing functions of γd from Ψd1(0) = 0 to Ψd1(1) = 1. These mappings are directly reconstructed
from the data since the data identifies FCd|d,w ∀d, w. So, from data on (cd, d, w) we now recover:
∀(d, w) pd|w and ∀d Ψd1(γd) .
Under this reparametrization, the system described in equation (2) rewrites, ∀h, with increasing
γd(h): {
h = γ0(h)p0|0 + γ1(h)p1|0
h = Ψ01(γ0(h))p0|1 + Ψ11(γ1(h))p1|1
. (19)
The conditional distribution functions FCd|d,w=0 are known, strictly increasing and invertible (Lemma
2). So if there is a unique solution {γd(h)}d∈{0,1} to system (19), there is a unique solution
{cd(h)}d∈{0,1} to the original system (2). Thus, we first show uniqueness of {γd(h)}d∈{0,1} to system
(19), and then we will come back to {cd(h)}d∈{0,1}.
Lemma 7 (Identification) (in the reparametrized problem)
Under assumption 9, there exists a unique strictly increasing γd(h) solution to system (19) starting
from (γ0(0), γ1(0)) = (0, 0) to (γ0(1), γ1(1)) = (1, 1).
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Proof of Lemma 7.
We prove that there exists a unique increasing solution to system (19).
Existence: existence is straightforward. Indeed, we are only focusing on images of the structural




Uniqueness : we need to show this is the unique strictly increasing solution to this problem. To
do this, we procede in two-steps. First we show that there is a unique increasing mapping between
the two conditional quantiles, denoted γ∗1(γ0), which solves the system. Then this mapping yields a
unique increasing solutions γ∗d(h). The idea is that, in the end, we want to identify which conditional
quantiles γ0 and γ1 corresponds to a given h. But to do that, we will first recover the conditional
quantile mapping, i.e., which γ1 corresponds to a given quantile γ0 in choice 0. And then we recover
to which h they both corresponds.
Step 1: Let us recover the conditional quantile mapping : γ̃1(γ0), i.e., which γ1 corresponds to a
given γ0, without knowing to which h they correspond. We want to show that there exist a unique
conditional quantile mapping solution to our problem under assumption 9. First, note that γ0(h)
and γ1(h) are C1 and strictly increasing functions of h. Thus, a higher γ0 corresponds to a higher
h and thus to a higher γ1. As a consequence, the mapping γ̃1(γ0) will also be C1 and strictly
increasing function of γ0 starting from γ̃1(0) = 0 (since γ1(0) = γ0(0) = 0) to γ̃1(1) = 1 (since
γ1(1) = γ0(1) = 1). As a consequence, we need to show that there exists a unique increasing
mapping γ̃1(γ0) : [0, 1] → [0, 1], with γ̃1(0) = 0 and γ̃1(1) = 1, solution to our system of equations
(19).
We can get restrictions on our mapping using our structural system (19). Subtract the first line
from the second line in the system of equations (19).




def⇐⇒ ∆F0(γ0(h)) = ∆F1(γ1(h)) ∀h (20)
Notice that the functions ∆F0 and ∆F1 are directly observed from the data as both Ψd1 and pd|w are
known ∀d, w. We also know they are C1 functions of γd as the sum of C1 functions (since Ψd1(γd)
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are C1).
Now, even if we do not observe h, if γ1 and γ0 correspond to the same unobserved h, we have:
∆F0(γ0) = ∆F1(γ1) by equation (20). As a consequence, a conditional quantile mapping γ̃1(γ0)
solution to the system (19) must solve the equation:
∆F0(γ0) = ∆F1(γ̃1(γ0)) ∀γ0 ∈ [0, 1] (21)
Now we show that there exists a unique increasing mapping γ̃1(γ0) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], with γ̃1(0) = 0
and γ̃1(1) = 1, solution to this equation (21) under assumption 9b.
First, let us see the implications of Lemma 3 in our reparametrized problem.




Proof. This is just a consequence of Lemma 3. First, notice that using our reparametrization:
∆Fd(γd(h)) = Ψd1(γd(h))pd|1 − γd(h)pd|0

















Now, dcd(h)/dh > 0 and dγd(h)/dh > 0 by strict monotonicity of the solution. So, if d∆FCd(cd)/dcd =
0 then d∆Fd(γd)/dγd = 0. As a consequence, Lemma 3 implies Lemma 3 bis in our reparametrized
problem.
Case K = 0: in the particular case where K = 0, there exists no point such that d∆Fd(γd)
dγd
= 0 ∀d.
∆Fd are C1 with no points at which the derivative is zero, so they are monotone and invertible. As
a consequence, we can easily recover the unique quantile mapping by inverting ∆F1 in system (21).
We have:
γ̃1(γ0) = (∆F1)
−1(∆F0(γ0)) ∀γ0 ∈ [0, 1]
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General case K > 0: There is a finite number K < ∞ of γ0 and γ1 such that d∆Fd(γd)/dγd = 0.
Let us denote γ10 < γ20 < ... < γK0 the ordered K γ0 such that d∆F0(γ0)/dγ0 = 0. And similarly,
denote γk1 from k = 1, ..., K the ordered K γ1 such that d∆F1(γ1)/dγ1 = 0.
First, we want to show that if the mapping γ̃1(γ0) solves the system, then γ1(γk0 ) = γk1 . Let us












Since the mapping γ̃1(γ0) must be increasing, we have: dγ̃1(γ0)/dγ0 > 0. As a consequence, if a
mapping γ̃1(γ0) is a solution, then when γ0 is such that d∆F0(γ0)/dγ0 = 0, the mapped γ1 must
also have a null derivative, i.e., d∆F1(γ̃1(γ0))/dγ1 = 0. So, in a solution, the K points such that
d∆F0(γ0)/dγ0 = 0 are mapped to the K points such that d∆F1(γ1)/dγ1 = 0.
Moreover, since we are looking for an increasing solution mapping γ̃1(γ0)), we necessarily have that
these K points are sorted, i.e.:
γ̃1(γ
k
0 ) = γ
k
1 ∀k ∈ {1, ..., K}
If this was not the case, the γ̃1(γ0) would not be increasing. Thus we have a unique solution for the
K γk0 points.
Now, we show that γ̃1(γ0) is also uniquely defined at other points than the γk0 . We use that the
function ∆Fd are piecewise monotone and invertible (because C1 with finite number of points with
null derivatives) between the points of null derivative. It is similar to the K = 0 case, except that
here we can only use piecewise monotonicity and partition the set accordingly.
Formally we procede as follows:
• Split the compact set [0, 1] of γ0 into K + 1 sub-intervals Γk0:












0 , 1] such that [0, 1] = ∪
k∈{1,...,K+1}
Γk0
We denote Sk0 the image of those subsets by ∆F0. We have ∆F0 : Γk0 → Sk0 .
• Do the same with the set of γ1: split the compact set [0, 1] of γ0 into K + 1 sub-intervals Γk1:












1 , 1] such that [0, 1] = ∪
k∈{1,...,K+1}
Γk1.
We denote Sk1 the image of those subsets by ∆F1. We have ∆F1 : Γk1 → Sk1 .
• Since ∆Fd are C1, in between the points of null derivative, ∆Fd are strictly monotone and
invertible. It implies that Skd are compact sets, as image of compact sets by strictly monotone
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functions. Moreover, Ψd1(0) = 0 for all d. Thus, ∆Fd(0) = 0 for all d. We also have Ψd1(1) = 1
for all d. Thus, ∆F0(1) = p0|1−p0|0 = (1−p1|1)−(1−p1|0) = −(p1|1−p1|0) = ∆F1(1). Moreover,
since we showed that a solution must have γ̃1(γk0 ) = γk1 , and given that we know a solution
exists, then theK points must satisfy our original equation (21). Which means that ∆F0(γk0 ) =
∆F1(γ
k
1 ) ∀k. It implies that Sk0 = Sk1 and we denote them Sk for all k ∈ {1, ..., K + 1}. We
have: S0 = [0,∆F0(γ10)], S1 = [∆F0(γ10),∆F0(γ20)], ..., SK+1 = [∆F0(γK0 ),∆F0(1)]. Notice
that we could have defined the image sets based on ∆F1 instead of ∆F0, as ∆F0(γk0 ) = ∆F1(γk1 )
∀k.
Now, we are looking for an increasing mapping solution to the system. By monotonicity, we
know that for a solution γ1 : Γk0 → Γk1 since the upper bounds (γkd ) of these sets are image of
each other. On each subintervals Γkd, the corresponding function ∆Fd is strictly monotone and
C1 ∀d. And we have that ∆F0 : Γk0 → Sk and ∆F1 : Γk1 → Sk. So we can invert it segment by
segment and get for any given k:
γ̃1(γ0) = (∆F1)
−1(∆F0(γ0)) ∀γ0 ∈ Γk0
This uniquely define the solution γ̃1(γ0) on Γk0.
• We repeat this ∀k ∈ {1, ..., K + 1} to obtain a unique mapping γ̃1(γ0) covering the whole set
of γ0, i.e., ∪
k∈{1,...,K+1}
Γk0 = [0, 1].
So, we have a unique mapping γ̃1(γ0) solution to equation (21).
Step 2: From this unique mapping between the conditional quantiles, we would like to recover the
unique quantile functions γd(h). To recover the functions γd(h), we just need to use any equations
of our original system (19) (the first one, for example) to obtain the h(γ0) corresponding to a given
(γ0, γ̃1(γ0)) as
h(γ0) = γ0p0|0 + γ̃1(γ0)p1|0
So we have a unique increasing solution (γ̃1(γ0), h(γ0)) ∀γ0 ∈ [0, 1]. By changing the arguments it
means that there exists a unique increasing solution (γ0(h), γ1(h)) to the system (19), starting from
(γ0(0), γ1(0)) = (0, 0) to (γ0(1), γ1(1)) = (1, 1). We denote this unique solution γ∗d(h).
Therefore, we proved Lemma 7.
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Thus, we have a unique increasing solution γ∗d(h) to system (19). Now recall that γd(h) =
FCd|d,w=0(cd(h)). By Lemma 2, FCd|d,w=0(cd) are strictly increasing and C







So, if there exists a unique set of solution {γd(h)}d∈{0,1} to the rewritten system (19), there exists
a unique set of increasing functions {cd(h)}d∈{0,1} solution to the original system (2).
This unique set of functions identify the optimal CCCs c∗d(h) from the data (cd, d, w).
C Appendix of Estimator Performance
C.1 T = 1 Special case
Let us focus on the one-shot decision problem with T = 1. This case is interesting because I can
obtain closed-form solutions to the problem, and easily compare true Maximum Likelihood Esti-
mator with my estimator. Obviously, because of the existence of this closed-form solution, the
time comparison between the methods is irrelevant. But this T = 1 example is useful for efficiency
comparison with maximum likelihood.
Closed form solution:
The agent works in t = 1, retires in t = 2 and dies in t = 3. The retiree consumes everything she
has left, to obtain a3 = 0. Thus the consumption of the retiree is c2 = (1 + r)a2 + pension(y2), and
is independent from η2. Moreover, by the budget constraint, a2 = (1 + r)a1 +y1d1− cd1 + (1−d1)b1.
I set the benefits b1 equal to 0 in this example. Thus in period t = 1, the only period of her working





η̃d(η1, γd, sd) + αd1 + ω(1− w)d1 + εd1
+ βE





where E[η̃d(η2, γ0, s0)] = eγ0+s
2
0/2, also there is no ε2 shock in the retirement period, and the retire-
ment utility is the same as the utility when unemployed.
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It yields the closed form solution for the conditional consumption in t = 1:
cd1 =
1





)1/σ((1 + r)2a+ (1 + r)y1d+ pension(y2)).
The agent consumes a share of available income which depends on the decision. Since the retiring
utility is the same as the unemployed one, I only identify γ1, s1 with respect to γ0, s0 and β.19 Thus,
the parameters to estimate are θ = (σ, γ1, s1, α, ω). β is fixed at 0.98, γ0 = 0, s0 = 0.25.
Table 4: Comparison of the estimators when T = 1
Method
Truth DCC MLE SMM
1,000 10,000 1,000 10,000 1,000 10,000
σ 1.60 1.5806 1.5782 1.6042 1.5992 1.6135 1.5970
(0.1759) (0.0827) (0.0444) (0.0137) (0.0560) (0.0211)
γ1 0.00 0.0071 0.0040 -0.0061 0.0007 -0.0269 -0.0009
(0.0714) (0.0286) (0.0205) (0.0072) (0.0213) (0.0078)
s1 0.40 0.4246 0.4043 0.4005 0.4001 0.3926 0.3857
(0.0747) (0.0366) (0.0187) (0.0060) (0.0245) (0.0073)
α -0.50 -0.4782 -0.5092 -0.4928 -0.5000 -0.4986 -0.4850
(0.3266) (0.1016) (0.0852) (0.0268) (0.0989) (0.0401)
ω -1.00 -1.0689 -1.0044 -1.0115 -0.9931 -1.0308 -1.0029
(0.1715) (0.0484) (0.1577) (0.0441) (0.2919) (0.0665)
Avg Time taken: 16s 32s 1s 9s 16s 50s
Other initializations: Number of Monte-Carlo = 1, 000.
Pr(w1 = 1) = 0.7. yH is set to 20 and in this case I impose Pr(y = yH) = 1.
a1 = 12.5 for everyone here. Benefits b = 0. Pension Percentage of income = 50%.
Fixed parameters: γ0 = 0, s0 = 0.25, β = 0.98, r = 0.05.
Results: (Table 4)
First, the speed comparison is irrelevant here. Indeed with one period one does not need to solve
19Notice that if I had a specific retirement utility, different from the unemployment one, I could also identify
parameters of unemployed with respect to retirees.
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for the value function so it is considerably easier, especially since we also have closed-form solutions
to simulate the model and compute the likelihood. On average here SMM already takes longer than
my DCC method but only because it requires to test more set of parameters to find the optimum,
as the objective are different between the two functions. It could be the reverse, and one could
expect both methods to go at relatively similar speed when T = 1 in general. The real benefits of
my method are when it allows to avoid solving for the value function, i.e., as soon as T > 1.
Concerning the statistical efficiency, as expected when you have a closed form solution for the
likelihood, MLE is always the most efficient. It is also the quickest as I do not need to estimate
any reduced form in a first stage and I am using a known closed form solution in this T = 1
case. Obviously once I go to more period, MLE becomes the longest method, and is becoming
untractable.
My method (DCC) is consistent and relatively efficient, but less than the MLE benchmark.
Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) with moments drawn from the reduced forms conditional
distributions of cd|d, w, x and conditional probabilities pd|w,x is also consistent. It is also more
efficient (except for the additive parameter ω). I lose efficiency because of the two-step nature of
my method, since I’m always computing the second step using first step optimal choices estimates.
But overall, the efficiency loss is largely compensated by time gains in more complicated models.
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